22-06-2012, 02:55 PM
3-D Secure
Description and basic aspects of the protocol
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The basic concept of the protocol is to tie the financial authorization process with an online authentication. This authentication is based on a three domain model (hence the 3-D in the name). The three domains are:
Acquirer Domain (the merchant and the bank to which money is being paid).
Issuer Domain (the bank which issued the card being used).
Interoperability Domain (the infrastructure provided by the credit card scheme to support the 3-D Secure protocol).
The protocol uses XML messages sent over SSL connections with client authentication (this ensures the authenticity of both peers, the server and the client, using digital certificates).
A transaction using Verified by Visa/SecureCode will initiate a redirect to the website of the card issuing bank to authorize the transaction. Each issuer could use any kind of authentication method (the protocol does not cover this) but typically, a password-based method is used, so to effectively buy on the Internet means using a password tied to the card. The Verified by Visa protocol recommends the bank's verification page to load in an inline frame session. In this way, the bank's systems can be held responsible for most security breaches.
The main difference between Visa and MasterCard implementations resides in the method to generate the UCAF (Universal Cardholder Authentication Field): MasterCard uses AAV (Accountholder Authentication Value) and Visa uses CAVV (Cardholder Authentication Verification Value).
Implementing the protocol
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The specifications are currently at version 1.0.2. Previous versions 0.7 (only used by Visa USA) and 1.0.1 have become redundant and are no longer supported. MasterCard and JCB have adopted version 1.0.2 of the protocol only.
In order for a Visa or MasterCard member bank to use the service, the bank has to operate compliant software that supports the latest protocol specifications. Once compliant software is installed, the member bank will perform product integration testing with the payment system server before it rolls out the system.
ACS providers
In 3-D Secure protocol, ACS (Access Control Server) is on the issuer side (banks). Currently, most banks outsource ACS to a third party. Commonly, the buyer's web browser shows the domain name of the ACS provider, rather than banks' domain name, however this is not required by the protocol. Dependent on the ACS provider, it is possible to specify a bank owned domain name for use by the ACS.
MPI providers
Each 3-D secure transaction involves two simple internet
request/response pairs: VEReq/VERes and PAReq/PARes. Visa and MasterCard don't license merchants for sending requests to their servers. They isolate their servers by licensing software providers which are called MPI (merchant plug-in) providers.
[edit] Merchants
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The advantage for merchants is the reduction of "unauthorized transaction" chargebacks. The disadvantage for merchants is that they have to purchase MPI to connect to the Visa/MasterCard Directory Server. This is expensive (setup fee, monthly fee and per-transaction fee); at the same time it represents additional revenue for MPI providers. Supporting 3-D Secure is complicated and, at times, creates transaction failures.
Buyers/credit card holders
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The intention behind the system is that cardholders will have a decreased risk of other people being able to use their payment cards fraudulently on the Internet.
In most current implementations of 3-D Secure, the issuing bank or its ACS provider prompts the buyer for a password that is known only to the bank/ACS provider and the buyer. Since the merchant does not know this password and is not responsible for capturing it, it can be used by the issuing bank as evidence that the purchaser is indeed their cardholder. This is intended to help decrease risk in two ways:
1. Copying card details, either by writing down the numbers on the card itself or by way of modified terminals or ATMs, does not result in the ability to purchase over the Internet because of the additional password, which is not stored on or written on the card.
2. Since the merchant does not capture the password, there is a reduced risk from security incidents at online merchants; while an incident may still result in hackers obtaining other card details, there is no way for them to get the associated password.
3-D Secure does not strictly require the use of password authentication. It is said to be possible[citation needed] to use it in conjunction with smart card readers, security tokens and the like. These types of devices might provide a better user experience for customers as they free the purchaser from having to use a secure password. Some issuers are now using such devices as part of the Chip Authentication Program or Dynamic Passcode Authentication schemes[citation needed].
One significant disadvantage is that cardholders are likely to see their browser connect to unfamiliar domain names as a result of vendors' MPI implementations and the use of outsourced ACS implementations by issuing banks, which might make it easier to perform phishing attacks on cardholders.
Criticism
Verifiability of site identity
The system involves a pop-up window or inline frame appearing during the online transaction process, requiring the cardholder to enter a password which, if the transaction is legitimate, their card-issuing bank will be able to authenticate. The problem for the cardholder is determining if the pop-up window or frame is really from their card issuer, when it could be from a fraudulent website attempting to harvest the cardholder's details. Such pop-up windows or script-based frames lack any access to any security certificate, eliminating any way to confirm the credentials of the implentation of 3-DS.
The "Verified by Visa" system has drawn some criticism,[2][3][4][5] since it is hard for users to differentiate between the legitimate Verified by Visa pop-up window or inline frame, and a fraudulent phishing site. This is because the pop-up window is served from a domain which is:
Not the site where the user is shopping.
Not the card issuing bank
Not visa.com or mastercard.com
In some cases, the Verified by Visa system has been mistaken by users for a phishing scam[6] and has itself become the target of some phishing scams.[7] The newer recommendation to use an inline frame (IFrame) instead of a popup has reduced user confusion, at the cost of making it harder, if not impossible, for the user to verify that the page is genuine in the first place. As of 2011, most web browsers do not provide a way to check the security certificate for the contents of an iframe.
Some card issuers also use Activation During Shopping (ADS),[8] in which cardholders who are not registered with the scheme are offered the opportunity of signing up (or forced into signing up) during the purchase process. This will typically take them to a form in which they are expected to confirm their identity by answering security questions which should be known to their card issuer. Again, this is done within the iframe where they cannot easily verify the site they are providing this information to—a cracked site or illegitimate merchant could in this way gather all the details they need to pose as the customer.
Implementation of 3-D Secure sign-up will often not allow a user to proceed with a purchase until they have agreed to sign up to 3-D Secure and its terms and conditions, not offering any alternative way of navigating away from the page than closing it, thus suspending the transaction.
Cardholders who are unwilling to take the risk of registering their card during a purchase, with the commerce site controlling the browser to some extent, can in some cases go to their bank's home page on the web in a separate browser window and register from there. When they return to the commerce site and start over they should see that their card is registered. The presence on the password page of the Personal Assurance Message (PAM) that they chose when registering is their confirmation that the page is coming from the bank. This still leaves some possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack if the card holder cannot verify the SSL Server Certificate for the password page. Some commerce sites will devote the full browser page to the authentication rather than using a frame (not necessarily an iFrame, which is a less secure object). In this case the lock icon in the browser should show the identity of either the bank or the operator of the verification site. The cardholder can confirm that this is in the same domain that they visited when registering their card, if it is not the domain of their bank.
Mobile browsers present particular problems for 3-D Secure, due to the common lack of certain features such as frames and pop-ups. Even if the merchant has a mobile Web site, unless the issuer is also mobile aware, the authentication pages may fail to render properly, or even at all. In the end, many[vague] analysts have concluded that the Activation During Shopping (ADS) protocols invite more risk than they remove and furthermore transfer this increased risk to the consumer.
In some cases, 3-D Secure ends up providing little security to the cardholder, and can act as a device to pass liability for fraudulent transactions from the bank or retailer to the cardholder. Legal conditions applied to the 3-D Secure service are sometimes worded in a way that makes it difficult for the cardholder to escape liability from fraudulent "cardholder not present" transactions.[citation needed]
Limited mobility
When a 3-D Secure confirmation code is required, if the confirmation code is sent by SMS on mobile phone (assuming she/he owns one) the customer may be unable to receive it depending on the country he currently is in. (not every mobile network accepts SMS)
3d passwords — Presentation Transcript
1. 3-D Password SchemeFor more secure authentication
2. AuthenticationAuthentication is a process of validating who are you to whom you claimed to beHuman authentication techniques are as follows:Knowledge Base (What you know)Token Based(what you have)Biometrics(what you are)Recognition Based(What you recognise)
3. Common Authentication Techniques used in computer worldTextual Passwords(Recall Based)-:Recall what you have created before.Graphical Passwords: (Recall Based+Recognition Based)Biometric schemes (fingerprints,voice recognition etc)
4. DrawbacksTextual Password:Textual Passwords should be easy to remember at the same time hard to guessFull password space for 8 characters consisting of both numbers and characters is 2 X 10¹⁴ From an research 25% of the passwords out of 15,000 users can guessed correctly by using brute force dictionary
5. DrawbacksGraphical PasswordGraphical passwords can be easily recorded as these schemes take a long time.One main drawback of applying biometric is its intrusiveness upon a users personnel characteristics.They require special scanning device to authenticate the user which is not acceptable for remote and internet users.
6. 3D PASSWORD SCHEMEThe 3D Password scheme is a new authentication scheme that combine RECOGNITION + RECALL +TOKENS +BIOMETRICIn one authentication system
7. The 3D password presents a virtual environment containing various virtual objects.The user walks through the environment and interacts with the objects The 3d Password is simply the combination and sequence of user interactions that occur in the 3D environment
8. 3D Password selectionVirtual objects can be any object we encounter in real life:A computer on which the user can typeA fingerprint reader that requires users fingerprintA paper or white board on which user can typeA Automated teller(ATM) machine that requires a tokenA light that can be switched on/offA television or radioA car that can be drivenA graphical password scheme
9. For EXAMPLE: Let us assume the user enters a virtual office then performs the following action10,24,91) Action=Open office door(10,24,91) Action=Close office door(4,34,18) Action=Tpeine,”C”(4,34,18) Action=Typing,”O”(4,34,18)Action=Typing,”N”(10,24,80)Action=Pick up the pen(1,18,80)Action=Draw point=(330,130)
13. 3D Passwords DifferentiatorsFlexibility:3D Passwords allows Multifactor authentication biometric , textual passwords can be embedded in 3D password technology.Strength: This scenario provides almost unlimited passwords possibility.Ease to Memorize: can be remembered in the form of short story.Respect of Privacy: Organizers can select authentication schemes that respect users privacy.
14. 3D Password Application AreasCritical ServersNuclear and military FacilitiesAirplanes and JetFightersATMs,Desktop and Laptop Logins, Web Authentication
15. Attacks and CountermeasuresBrute Force Attack: The attack is very difficult becauseTime required to login may vary form 20s to 2 min therefore it is very time consuming.Cost of Attack: A 3D Virtual environment may contain biometric object ,the attacker has to forge all biometric information.Well Studied Attack: Attacker tries to get the most probable distribution of 3D Password. This is difficult because attacker has to perform customized attack fo different virtual environment .
16. Shoulder Surfing Attacks: Attacker uses camera to record the users 3D passwords.This attack is more succesfulTiming Attack: The Attacker observes how long it takes the legitimate user to perform correct log in using 3D Password.which gives an indication of 3-D Passwords length.This attack cannot be succesful since it gives the attacker mere hints.
17. QUERIES ?...
What is 3D Password Scheme
Secure authentication scheme is one of the most important requirements of current times, considering the fact that more and more activities are being online, let it be shopping, data access from clouds, etc. No doubt there are several authentication schemes already available and being used worldwide, however these preexisting password and authentication schemes have several vulnerabilities.
Drawbacks for Preexisting Password Mechanisms
Summarily, textual passwords are guessable; drawback of applying biometrics is its intrusiveness upon a user’s personal characteristic, Smart Cards and Tokens can be stolen and duplicated as well for illegal use, weakness of Graphical Passwords is that the server needs to store the seeds of the portfolio images of each user in plain text. Also, the process of selecting a set of pictures from the picture database can be tedious and time consuming for the user.
3D Password Scheme
The fact that vulnerabilities exist in preexisting password schemes, researchers are thinking of a password and authentication scheme, which is more efficient in terms of security, the paper “Three-Dimensional Password for More Secure Authentication” (by Fawaz A. Alsulaiman and Abdulmotaleb El Saddik, Senior Member, IEEE) is helpful in getting the insight about this mechanism.
The paper also talks in-depth about several related topics, like the vulnerabilities in the current authentication schemes, the concept of 3D password scheme, its components, etc.
Basically a 3D Interactive environment is created, now the way user interacts with any element or object at particular co-ordinate, in this 3D environment, this way of interaction is recorded and becomes a part of his password, now any number of such interactions can be recorded.
This interaction could be, a textual password being entered on a system in 3D environment, or may be even the walking pattern of the user, all this is the choice of developer.
Here is a video which describes the 3D Password Mechanism pretty well.