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German V-1 rockets raining over London and Russian self-propelled
Katyusha rockets pulverising German forces on the eastern front are
enduring images of the Second World War. After 1945, it seemed the
rudimentary technologies embodied in these projectiles were poised
to take off. Instead, it would take several decades for these rockets to
transform into smart and lethal battlefield weapons. Cruise Missiles:
Evolution, Proliferation and Future traces the emergence and evolution of
this unsung weapon system, and makes a timely and useful contribution
to contemporary security literature.
With the onset of the missile age in the 1950s, it was the ballistic
rather than the cruise missile that raced ahead. Aside from technological
constraints, there were doctrinal reasons that ensured the cruise missile
played second fiddle to the ballistic missile throughout the Cold War.
Strategic deterrence was the primary goal of the US and Soviet military
planners and the ballistic missile became the only viable means to deliver
nuclear ordinance over inter-continental ranges given the vast distance
between the American and Soviet heartland.
Since the mid-1970s, significant advances in ‘enabling technologies’
(p. 58) such as guidance and control, propulsion, and, stealth technologies
dramatically transformed the range, lethality, survivability, and accuracy
of cruise missiles. Today, cruise missiles represent a significant counter force capability that can potentially alter the terms of a conflict, even
between unequal adversaries.
The main advantage of cruise missiles is that they are relatively
inexpensive, compact, accurate, and easier to develop or access than
ballistic technology. On the average, the cost of a cruise missile is onesixth
of a ballistic missile. Aside from high operating and support costs,
the technological prequisites to sustain a ballistic missile force or a modern
air force ensures these capabilities remain confined to a select group of
nations.
On the other hand, ‘130 types of cruise missiles are distributed among
75 nations’ (p. 80) of which 56 countries are pure importers. Cruise missiles
are then truly ‘a poor man’s air force’ (p. 81) but with capabilities that even
the leading states have come to value. The latest generation cruise missiles
such as the Indian BrahMos are supersonic (faster than speed of sound)
making defence nearly impossible. Unlike ballistic missiles that follow
a predictable trajectory, modern cruise missiles can fly at low altitudes
to stay below the enemy’s radar horizon and even hide behind terrain
features. Thus, like aircraft they can approach and attack targets from
different directions to overwhelm air defences. Disadvantages include
guidance systems that can be undermined by electronic and anti-satellite
warfare. The main limitation though is that the cruise missiles have a
shorter range and smaller payloads than ballistic missiles or bombers,
which makes a cruise missile’s primary military function as a precision
counter force weapon.
What is Driving the Diffusion and Proliferation of this Technology?
On the supply side, the study by Mishra highlights that while the great
powers have been nearly uncompromising on the diffusion of ballistic
technology with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as
its primary horizontal non-proliferation tool, cruise missiles have ‘been
generously supplied by the major powers to some countries in the
developing world’ (p. 120). One reason is cruise missiles, given their
shorter ranges and mostly tactical capabilities, have generally escaped the
attention of serious arms control. Furthermore, given that the versatility
of cruise missiles is directly connected to the platform it is married to—
fighter aircraft, heavy bomber, warship, and submarine—it is impossible
to enforce a uniform arms control arrangement without including the
carrier platforms themselves. This, in turn, is probably unattainable
because of the diversity of force structures across the leading states, the difficulty of verification mechanisms for some platforms, and ensuring
subsequent compliance to agreed limits.
On the demand side, the author remarks ‘… the security guarantees
extended by the major powers to different states’ fade away, ‘states will
devise self-help security arrangements’ (pp. 108–09). Thus, as the USled
unipolar order is displaced by one where power is more distributed,
regional security goals would impel states to modernize their military
forces more purposively. We are already seeing this play out in real time.
The Eurasian rimland states like China and Iran, and more recently
Syria, are actively pursuing cruise technologies with the asymmetric
strategy to deny or limit the US’s ability to project its superior maritime
power around the periphery of these states. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
(ASCMs) have, therefore, acquired a new salience in the military
doctrines of such states. Even smaller littoral states, like Vietnam, have
acquired anti-ship missiles to secure their exclusive economic zones from
regional navies. The US too has exploited cruise missiles innovatively. The
US Navy currently fields four SSGNs—these are converted Ohio-class
submarines (originally SSBNs armed with Trident ballistic missiles) each
fitted with 154 Tomahawk conventional Land Attack Cruise Missiles
(LACM). Some analysts view these capabilities as a vital component of a
US counter to Chinese quantitative and qualitative build up of missiles.
While the author does mention ‘security deficits’ in ‘regional security
complexes’ (p. 105) as a demand driver for acquiring cruise missiles, the
study does not conceptualize the different uses of cruise missiles and
explicitly link this phenomenon to geopolitics. How cruise missiles are
exploited by states depends on their geopolitical context. Eurasian rimland
states are showing a clear trend in leveraging cruise missiles as part of
a broader anti-access strategy to keep rival navies out. Maritime powers
like the US, which must operate at stand-off ranges, have consequently
exploited longer range cruise missiles married to a variety of platforms as
‘big sticks’ (p. 80) to target both irregular and conventional threats across
the Eurasian continent.
The most highly capable ASCMs come from the former Soviet or
Russian arsenal such as the SS-N-22 Sunburn, the SS-N-26 Yakhont
(recently transferred to Syria), as well as more modern systems from the
Klub family. For example, the Moskits (Sunburn) are anti-ship missiles,
flying up to three times the speed of sound and sea-skimming (5 feet
above the water). They were specifically designed to overcome the Aegis defence systems, and SM-2 and SM-3 defence missiles protecting
American carrier battle groups. Such innovations emanate from Soviet
naval doctrine during the Cold War that was predicated on developing
anti-access capabilities that could pose a threat to forward-based NATO
naval forces. As the author cites, historically, Russia developed a ‘great
many designs which had and still have no western equivalent’ (p. 41).
Some of these ASCMs have found their way into the arsenals of states like
China, Iran, and Syria who have a clear interest in keeping the US Navy
at an arms length. The US too ‘has been one of the leading exporters
of cruise missiles’ (p. 109). The anti-ship Harpoon has been sold to 23
countries including India and Pakistan.
Even at the strategic level, cruise missiles could assume a front line
role. In the historical contest between ballistic and cruise missiles, the
former prevailed because it was invulnerable to any form of defence and,
therefore, indispensable as a second-strike platform. Ironically, in the postCold
War era, as ballistic missile defence technologies have developed
along with the institutional impetus for ABM technologies in the US,
new generation cruise missiles will emerge as vital technologies for even
strategic missions. The study notes that the Pakistani nuclear-capable
Babur LACM (based on the US Tomahawk) is a response to India’s efforts
at developing anti-ballistic systems.
What are the implications for India? The multi-role BrahMos (1,000
missiles have been ordered between the three services) with several
variants and longer ranges in the pipeline is providing lethal war fighting
capabilities to the Indian armed forces. Its assimilation into India’s force
structure and the honing of supporting capabilities, however, remains a
work in progress. Weaknesses in early-warning capability and C4ISR, in
general, are apparent in India’s case. Military modernization must focus on
developing a complete and integrated picture of the potential battlefield
as without advanced surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, cruise
missiles cannot be exploited to their full potential.
Given the generally disadvantageous geostrategic position for Indian
forces on the Himalayan frontiers, cruise missiles offer an unrivalled
stand-off capability that will buttress India’s conventional deterrence.
According to recent reports, BrahMos LACM mobile units have been
deployed in the western sector.
In sum, this study must be commended for dwelling on a weapon
system that has already become an integral part of a state’s quiver.