12-07-2012, 02:55 PM
please ,send me a seminar ppt of "Design and Implementation of TARF: A Trust-Aware Routing Framework for WSNs"
please send this immediatly,because the seminar should conduct the next weak
"
12-07-2012, 02:55 PM
please ,send me a seminar ppt of "Design and Implementation of TARF: A Trust-Aware Routing Framework for WSNs" please send this immediatly,because the seminar should conduct the next weak "
10-10-2012, 05:43 PM
Design and Implementation of TARF: A Trust-Aware Routing Framework for WSNs
Design and Implementation of TARF.pdf (Size: 1.66 MB / Downloads: 64) Abstract The multihop routing in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) offers little protection against identity deception through replaying routing information. An adversary can exploit this defect to launch various harmful or even devastating attacks against the routing protocols, including sinkhole attacks, wormhole attacks, and Sybil attacks. The situation is further aggravated by mobile and harsh network conditions. Traditional cryptographic techniques or efforts at developing trust-aware routing protocols do not effectively address this severe problem. To secure the WSNs against adversaries misdirecting the multihop routing, we have designed and implemented TARF, a robust trust-aware routing framework for dynamic WSNs. Without tight time synchronization or known geographic information, TARF provides trustworthy and energy-efficient route. Most importantly, TARF proves effective against those harmful attacks developed out of identity deception; the resilience of TARF is verified through extensive evaluation with both simulation and empirical experiments on large-scale WSNs under various scenarios including mobile and RF-shielding network conditions. Further, we have implemented a low-overhead TARF module in TinyOS; as demonstrated, this implementation can be incorporated into existing routing protocols with the least effort. Based on TARF, we also demonstrated a proof-of-concept mobile target detection application that functions well against an antidetection mechanism. INTRODUCTION WIRELESSSENSOR networks (WSNs) [2] are ideal candidates for applications to report detected events of interest, such as military surveillance and forest fire monitoring. A WSN comprises battery-powered sensor nodes with extremely limited processing capabilities. With a narrow radio communication range, a sensor node wirelessly sends messages to a base station via a multihop path. However, the multihop routing of WSNs often becomes the target of malicious attacks. An attacker may tamper nodes physically, create traffic collision with seemingly valid transmission, drop or misdirect messages in routes, or jam the communication channel by creating radio interference [3]. This paper focuses on the kind of attacks in which adversaries misdirect network traffic by identity deception through replaying routing information. Based on identity deception, the adversary is capable of launching harmful and hard-to-detect attacks against routing, such as selective forwarding, wormhole attacks, sinkhole attacks and Sybil attacks [4]. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS Before elaborating the detailed design of TARF, we would like to clarify a few design considerations first, including certain assumptions in Section 2.1 and the goals in Section 2.3. 2.1 Assumptions We target secure routing for data collection tasks, which are one of the most fundamental functions of WSNs. In a data collection task, a sensor node sends its sampled data to a remote base station with the aid of other intermediate nodes, as shown in Fig. 1. Though there could be more than one base station, our routing approach is not affected by the number of base stations; to simplify our discussion, we assume that there is only one base station. An adversary may forge the identity of any legal node through replaying that node’s outgoing routing packets and spoofing the acknowledgment packets, even remotely through a wormhole. Additionally, to merely simplify the introduction of TARF, we assume no data aggregation is involved. Nonetheless, our approach can still be applied to cluster-based WSNs with static clusters, where data are aggregated by clusters before being relayed [24] Authentication Requirements Though a specific application may determine whether data encryption is needed, TARF requires that the packets are properly authenticated, especially the broadcast packets from the base station. The broadcast from the base station is asymmetrically authenticated so as to guarantee that an adversary is not able to manipulate or forge a broadcast message from the base station at will. Importantly, with authenticated broadcast, even with the existence of attackers, TARF may use TrustManager (Section 3.4) and the received broadcast packets about delivery information (Section 3.2.1) to choose trustworthy path by circumventing compromised nodes. Without being able to physically capturing the base station, it is generally very difficult for the adversary to manipulate the base station broadcast packets which are asymmetrically authenticated. The asymmetric authentication of those broadcast packets from the base station is crucial to any successful secure routing protocol. It can be achieved through existing asymmetrically authenticated broadcast schemes that may require loose time synchronization. As an example, TESLA [14] achieves asymmetric authenticated broadcast through a symmetric cryptographic algorithm and a loose delay schedule to disclose the keys from a key chain. Other examples of asymmetric authenticated broadcast schemes requiring either loose or no time synchronization are found in [25], [26]. Routing Procedure TARF, as with many other routing protocols, runs as a periodic service. The length of that period determines how frequently routing information is exchanged and updated. At the beginning of each period, the base station broadcasts a message about data delivery during last period to the whole network consisting of a few contiguous packets (one packet may not hold all the information). Each such packet has a field to indicate how many packets are remaining to complete the broadcast of the current message. The completion of the base station broadcast triggers the exchange of energy report in this new period. Whenever a node receives such a broadcast message from the base station, it knows that the most recent period has ended and a new period has just started. No tight time synchronization is required for a node to keep track of the beginning or ending of a period. During each period, the EnergyWatcher on a node monitors energy consumption of one-hop transmission to its neighbors and processes energy cost reports from those neighbors to maintain energy cost entries in its neighborhood table; its TrustManager also keeps track of network loops and processes broadcast messages from the base station about data delivery to maintain trust level entries in its neighborhood table. TrustManager A node N’s TrustManager decides the trust level of each neighbor based on the following events: discovery of network loops, and broadcast from the base station about data delivery. For each neighbor b of N, TNb denotes the trust level of b in N’s neighborhood table. At the beginning, each neighbor is given a neutral trust level 0.5. After any of those events occurs, the relevant neighbors’ trust levels are updated. Note that many existing routing protocols have their own mechanisms to detect routing loops and to react accordingly [31], [32], [28]. In that case, when integrating TARF into those protocols with antiloop mechanisms, TrustManager may solely depend on the broadcast from the base station to decide the trust level; we adopted such a policy when implementing TARF later (see Section 5). If antiloop mechanisms are both enforced in the TARF component and the routing protocol that integrates TARF, then the resulting hybrid protocol may overly react toward the discovery of loops. Though sophisticated loop-discovery methods exist in the currently developed protocols, they often rely on the comparison of specific routing cost to reject routes likely leading to loops [32]. To minimize the effort to integrate TARF and the existing protocol and to reduce the overhead, when an existing routing protocol does not provide any antiloop mechanism, we adopt the following mechanism to detect routing loops. Analysis on EnergyWatcher and TrustManager Now that a node N relies on its EnergyWatcher and TrustManager to select an optimal neighbor as its next-hop node, we would like to clarify a few important points on the design of EnergyWatcher and TrustManager. First, as described in Section 3.1, the energy cost report is the only information that a node is to passively receive and take as “fact.” It appears that such acceptance of energy cost report could be a pitfall when an attacker or a compromised node forges false report of its energy cost. Note that the main interest of an attacker is to prevent data delivery rather than to trick a data packet into a less efficient route, considering the effort it takes to launch an attack. As far as an attack aiming at preventing data delivery is concerned, TARF well mitigates the effect of this pitfall through the operation of TrustManager. Note that the TrustManager on one node does not take any recommendation from the TrustManager on another node. If an attacker forges false energy report to form a false route, such intention will be defeated by TrustManager: when the TrustManager on one node finds out the many delivery failures from the broadcast messages of the base station, it degrades the trust level of its current next-hop node; when that trust level goes below certain threshold, it causes the node to switch to a more promising next-hop node. CONCLUSIONS We have designed and implemented TARF, a robust trustaware routing framework for WSNs, to secure multihop routing in dynamic WSNs against harmful attackers exploiting the replay of routing information. TARF focuses on trustworthiness and energy efficiency, which are vital to the survival of a WSN in a hostile environment. With the idea of trust management, TARF enables a node to keep track of the trustworthiness of its neighbors and thus to select a reliable route
07-11-2012, 11:16 PM
You completed some good points on seminarprojects.com . I did a search on the theme and found the majority of persons will have the same opinion with your phorum. Wish you luck!
08-11-2012, 10:33 AM
to get information about the topic "Design and Implementation of TARF: A Trust-Aware Routing Framework for WSNs" related topic refer the link bellow
https://seminarproject.net/Thread-design...sns--57737
10-11-2012, 09:29 PM
Very well written information. It will be supportive to everyone who usess it, including yours truly :). Keep doing what you are doing - for sure i will check out more posts. Wish you luck!
06-08-2013, 06:49 PM
please send me the notes to write the coding in ns2 to create wireless node ,to create the base station and adversary node
07-08-2013, 09:43 AM
To get full information or details of Design and Implementation of TARF: A Trust-Aware Routing Framework for WSNs please have a look on the pages
https://seminarproject.net/Thread-design...k-for-wsns https://seminarproject.net/Thread-design...sns--46572 if you again feel trouble on Design and Implementation of TARF: A Trust-Aware Routing Framework for WSNs please reply in that page and ask specific fields |
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