26-02-2013, 04:49 PM
Design and Implementation of TARF: A Trust-Aware Routing Framework for WSNs
A Trust-Aware Routing.pdf (Size: 600.81 KB / Downloads: 32)
Abstract
The multihop routing in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) offers little protection against identity deception through replaying
routing information. An adversary can exploit this defect to launch various harmful or even devastating attacks against the routing
protocols, including sinkhole attacks, wormhole attacks, and Sybil attacks. The situation is further aggravated by mobile and harsh
network conditions. Traditional cryptographic techniques or efforts at developing trust-aware routing protocols do not effectively
address this severe problem. To secure the WSNs against adversaries misdirecting the multihop routing, we have designed and
implemented TARF, a robust trust-aware routing framework for dynamic WSNs. Without tight time synchronization or known
geographic information, TARF provides trustworthy and energy-efficient route. Most importantly, TARF proves effective against those
harmful attacks developed out of identity deception; the resilience of TARF is verified through extensive evaluation with both simulation
and empirical experiments on large-scale WSNs under various scenarios including mobile and RF-shielding network conditions.
Further, we have implemented a low-overhead TARF module in TinyOS; as demonstrated, this implementation can be incorporated
into existing routing protocols with the least effort. Based on TARF, we also demonstrated a proof-of-concept mobile target detection
application that functions well against an antidetection mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
IRELESSSENSOR
networks (WSNs) [2] are ideal candi-
dates for applications to report detected events of
interest, such as military surveillance and forest fire
monitoring. A WSN comprises battery-powered sensor
nodes with extremely limited processing capabilities. With
a narrow radio communication range, a sensor node
wirelessly sends messages to a base station via a multihop
path. However, the multihop routing of WSNs often
becomes the target of malicious attacks. An attacker may
tamper nodes physically, create traffic collision with
seemingly valid transmission, drop or misdirect messages
in routes, or jam the communication channel by creating
radio interference [3]. This paper focuses on the kind of
attacks in which adversaries misdirect network traffic by
identity deception through replaying routing information.
Based on identity deception, the adversary is capable of
launching harmful and hard-to-detect attacks against
routing, such as selective forwarding, wormhole attacks,
sinkhole attacks and Sybil attacks [4].