30-03-2012, 04:30 PM
send full documentation for Dynamic En-route Filtering scheme for data reporting in wireless sensor networks
30-03-2012, 04:30 PM
send full documentation for Dynamic En-route Filtering scheme for data reporting in wireless sensor networks
07-07-2012, 04:12 PM
Dynamic En-route Filtering Scheme for Data Reporting in Wireless Sensor Networks Dynamic En-route Filtering Scheme.pdf (Size: 805.15 KB / Downloads: 34) Abstract In wireless sensor networks, adversaries can inject false data reports via compromised nodes and launch DoS attacks against legitimate reports. Recently, a number of filtering schemes against false reports have been proposed. However, they either lack strong filtering capacity or cannot support highly dynamic sensor networks very well. Moreover, few of them can deal with DoS attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a dynamic en-route filtering scheme that addresses both false report injection and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks. In our scheme, each node has a hash chain of authentication keys used to endorse reports; meanwhile, a legitimate report should be authenticated by a certain number of nodes. INTRODUCTION WIRELESS sensor networks consist of a large number of small sensor nodes having limited computation capacity, restricted memory space, limited power resource, and short-range radio communication device. In military applications, sensor nodes may be deployed in hostile environments such as battlefields to monitor the activities of enemy forces. In these scenarios, sensor networks may suffer different types of malicious attacks. One type is called false report injection attacks [24], in which adversaries inject into sensor networks the false data reports containing nonexistent events or faked readings from compromised nodes. These attacks not only cause false alarms at the base station, but also drain out the limited energy of forwarding nodes. RELATED WORK We first discuss existing filtering schemes, then introduce some routing protocols used in wireless sensor networks. The routing strategies of these protocols affect the way that sensor nodes can exchange and disseminate key information, so they have significant impact on filtering schemes. Existing Schemes for Filtering False Reports Ye et al. proposed a statistical en-route filtering (SEF) scheme [20] based on probabilistic key distribution. In SEF, a global key pool is divided into partitions, each containing keys. Every node randomly picks keys from one partition. When some event occurs, each sensing node (that detects this event) creates a MAC for its report using one of its random keys. The cluster-head aggregates the reports from the sensing nodes and guarantees each aggregated report contains MACs that are generated using the keys from different partitions, where is a predefined security parameter. Given that no more than nodes can be compromised, each forwarding node can detect a false report with a probability proportional to . The filtering capacity of SEF is independent of the network topology, but constrained by the value of . To increase the filtering capacity, we can reduce the value of ; however, this allows the adversaries to break all partitions more easily. In addition, since the keys are shared by multiple nodes, the compromised nodes can impersonate other nodes and report some forged events that “occur” in other clusters. CONCLUSION In this paper, we propose a dynamic en-route quarantine scheme for filtering false data injection attacks and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks. In our scheme, each node uses its own auth-keys to authenticate their reports and a legitimate report should be endorsed by nodes. The auth-keys of each node form a hash chain and are updated in each round. The cluster-head disseminates the first auth-key of every node to forwarding nodes and then sends the reports followed by disclosed auth-keys. The forwarding nodes verify the authenticity of the disclosed keys by hashing the disseminated keys and then check the integrity and validity of the reports using the disclosed keys. |
|