06-07-2012, 10:14 AM
Environment and Politics in India
The Emergence of Environmental Policy
In the early 1970s the environmental feasibility of economic growth
became an issue of governmental concern in its own right for the first
time in India. The impetus came from the 1972 United Nations
Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm. This reflected the
international trend.
Before, there had been environmentally relevant disputes, for
instance, over the use of water or forests. In the case of India, such
historical developments have recently been of academic interest
(Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Arnold and Guha, 1995). However, it was
only when the very survival of humankind was perceived to be
threatened because of ecological degradation that environmental
policies and bureaucracies began to emerge on national and
international levels (Jänicke and Weidner, 1997, Jänicke et al., 1999).
The Stockholm conference was of lasting impact in this sense.
As elsewhere, the environmental challenge was initially seen
primarily as a threat to economic development in India. As quoted by
Renu Khator (1991: 23), Prime Minister Indira Gandhi summed up
this point of view in her address to the plenary session of the
conference on 14 June 1972, stating:
On the one hand the rich look askance at our continuing poverty, on the other
they warn us against their own methods. We do not wish to impoverish the
environment any further and, yet, we cannot for a moment forget the grim
poverty of large numbers of people. Are not poverty and need the greatest
polluters?
In this perspective, environmental protection appeared to merely increase
the costs of economic activity. It was thus considered
unaffordable for developing countries. Environmental worries were
seen as a concern mainly of the rich world–and yet another means to
keep the poor world poor (Paulus, 1992). To some extent, this
perspective still prevails. In the words of J. Mohan Rao (1995a: 681),
‘many in India today including government officials … regard the
environmental lobby as a child of northern conspiracy and northern
funding’.
Even back in 1972, however, this was not the only attitude. Indira
Gandhi returned from Stockholm having become something of an
environmentalist herself. Renu Khator (1991) lists several reasons
66 Taking the State to Court
why this prime minister with autocratic tendencies became interested
in the issue. Indira Gandhi saw herself as a leader not only of her
nation but of the Third World in general and was therefore eager to
pursue what she saw as a progressive issue. More important, she used
this, and other issues, to centralize power. Forests, water and energy
had previously fallen exclusively under state legislation. Pressing
environmental concerns provided an opportunity for constitutional
reform, increasing the influence of the central government.
Finally, Indira Gandhi perceived the chance of using
environmental issues in order to politically mobilize mass frustration
by predominantly symbolic means. Khator labels the attempt to deal
with environmental challenges without affecting the economic and
social basis of the Indian society as ‘politics of reconciliation’ (1991):
22). While this may appear disappointing, it must be emphasized that
it is typical of emerging environmental policies the world over to be
chiefly symbolical at first (Jänicke and Weidner, 1997, Jänicke et al.,
1999).
In 1974, the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act was
passed. Since then, there has been ample legislative activity in India
(Pathak, 1988). In 1976, the constitution was amended in order to
include environmental protection among the principles ruling State
policy and even individual behaviour:
• The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to
safeguard the forests and wildlife. (Art. 48A)
• It shall be the duty of every citizen of India … to protect and improve the
natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have
compassion for living creatures. (Art. 51A)
International environmental politics continued to affect the Indian
government, as has been exemplified by the Montreal Protocol, the
international agreement to phase out ozone-depleting substances.
While Indian diplomacy played a role in securing funds for poor
nations to pursue this goal, the government had difficulty in
developing a national strategy (Sims, 1995).1
1 Of course, there are technological problems involved here. However, implementation
problems are also predictable, particularly as small-scale industries account for some
two-thirds of the chlorofluorocarbons applied in India.
Environment and Politics in India 67
4.2 Implementation Deficits
The 1974 Water Act serves as the paradigm of Indian environmental
legislation and of its failure to achieve the desired goals. Khator
(1991: 72) states that ‘from the very beginning, several loopholes
existed in the Water Act, making it symbolic in nature and ineffective
in practice’.
The Act established a network of State and Central Pollution
Control Boards, but their hierarchy and responsibilities remained
unclear. Neither acceptable limits of pollution nor clear time spans for
their implementation were defined. Municipalities had been identified
as the main polluters of India’s water bodies, but they were not made
liable for prosecution.
By the mid-1980s, Khator (1991) counted more than fifty
different items of environmental legislation in India, thirty of which
dealt with pollution alone. There were various programmes of the
central and state governments for afforestation and soil conservation.
Major policy issues such as the prevention of air pollution and
environmental protection in general became the jurisdiction of the
Pollution Control Boards. In addition to their network, India today has
a full-fledged Ministry of the Environment. It was initially established
as the Department of the Environment in 1980 and turned into a
ministry in 1985.
The vast bureaucracy did little more than create awareness and
establish a monitoring network. According to Khator (1991: 100), the
achievements of this organizational endeavour can be ‘summed up in
a few sentences’:
The rate of deforestation has not been reduced; the level of pollution in water
has not been decreased; and the quality of air has not been improved in any
significant way….Even after ten years, the reports of the achievements of the
Central Water Pollution Control Board emphasize activities rather than
achievements.
As argued above, local power structures in India do not necessarily
reflect constitutional aspirations. According to Khator, this also holds
true for environmental regulations. She made out five core reasons for
the almost complete failure of India’s environmental bureaucracy:
• the cost of enforcement for local officials,
• the cost of compliance for polluters,
68 Taking the State to Court
• conflicting interests of state and central authorities,
• rivalry with other state or central departments, and
• the politicization of bureaucratic structures.
Khator’s five arguments of 1991 are briefly summarized here.
While those who formulated policies were exposed to pressures
by environmentally concerned international donor agencies, those in
charge of implementation of the policies were under the pressures of
powerful local elites, which include the usually well-connected
owners of polluting industries. Within their bureaucracies, officials
were held responsible for following procedural rules but not for the
results of their actions. As they were generally perceived to be prone
to corruption, there was no reputation to be lost. The future careers of
the mostly frustrated and alienated low-ranking bureaucrats depended
on their being perceived as not causing trouble. This scenario meant
that the individual cost of enforcing strict environmental standards
became considerably higher than that of paying lip service to
procedures and neglecting environmental standards in practice.
For the polluters, in turn, the cost of compliance tended to be
higher than the cost of non-compliance. Corruption, litigation and
(rather unlikely and normally low) fines were cheaper than installing
anti-pollution devices. Most industries were operating under
considerable pressure to cut costs in highly competitive markets. The
polluters’ general view was that bureaucrats could be bought. Their
local power alliances with high-ranking party and State officials were
based more on suspicion than on mutual interest. Business people did
not normally get involved in policy processes. The cost of lobbying
would again have been higher than that of simple non-compliance.
This, in turn, meant that legislation tended to be unrealistic in terms of
economic viability, thus reinforcing polluters’ general approach of
non-compliance.
Institutional inefficiency was exacerbated by the fact that state
governments had to implement central government policies. The
relationship between them was often characterized by animosity.
Beyond formal recognition, there tended to be little concern for the
needs of other government levels. Authorities at the state level were
likely to see environmental regulations primarily as the central
government’s tools to delay projects and to interfere in state interests.
The chances of successful environmental policy were further
diminished by the fact that the bureaucracy concerned was a weak
Environment and Politics in India 69
player within the rivalry of various government agencies. It had no
powerful clientele, nor even a clearly defined target group.
Information about the confusing multitude of environmental hazards
was still scarce in India, making the cost of action appear to be higher
than the costs of inaction. Finally, the environmental bureaucrats had
little legal means of enforcing their policy objectives if other agencies
proved unwilling to cooperate.
The politicization of the administrative bodies along partisan lines
further diminished motivation and efficiency. In day to day practice,
loyalty to party personnel mattered more than policy compliance.
This scenario of 1991 still was basically accurate in 1998. However,
public interest litigation had in the meantime given some clout
to the Pollution Control Boards, as Deb Kumar Bose, chairman of the
WBPCB, and other high ranking officers told me in interviews.
Industries are now more afraid of increasing fines or closures of their
companies in the case of non-compliance. Environmental
consultancies have become good business because companies are
required to prepare environmental impact assessments and are
increasingly taking this matter seriously, particularly when large sums
of investment are involved.
The general impression today is that the judiciary has become an
ally for those in the environmental bureaucracy committed to the goal
of their institutions. Books on environmental law include extensive
chapters of public interest litigation (Shastri, 1990; Leelakrishnan,
1992). Leading judges are aware of their potentially decisive role, as
the following quotation of former Supreme Court Chief Justice R.S.
Pathak (1998: 1178f) exemplifies;
Where, however, there is no law on the subject it will be a question for
consideration whether the [Supreme] Court, in the guise of affirmative action,
can embark on a programme of environmental protection and enter into the area
of law making. The Court has done so in some cases, assuming an ‘activist’ role,
provoked no doubt by the absence of pertinent executive action or of the
requisite legislation.
Nevertheless, Khator laments that Indian environmental policies have
been mostly symbolic. While this complaint is common for OECD
nations as well (Huber, 1991), in the case of India we are dealing with
a keener perception of implementation deficits. Renu Khator (1991:
123) makes out as general deficiencies of India’s institutional life:
70 Taking the State to Court
Lack of rationality and neutrality in officials; absence of the public trust in the
bureaucracy; presence of corruption and the acceptance of this corruption by the
society; existence of the alliance between the elite and the ruling party; nonaccountability
of technicians; and finally, the domination of political patronage
in policy processes.
Gadgil and Guha (1995: 48) agree with this dismal assessment of
Indian government institutions:
Each department has developed a culture of a well-knit, highly organized group
pursuing its own vested interests in an independent fashion. Of course, each
department does interact with others to carve out the total share of the pie, but to
no other useful purpose.
Given the sorry state of government affairs in India, it is naïve to
merely suggest technocratic solutions to the ecological impasses.
Specialized environmental courts, introduction of preventive
strategies and modernization of public sector industries as suggested
by Paulus (1992) can be of little help as long as societal conditions do
not allow such instruments to operate effectively. Consequently,
Paulus also demands greater transparency and public participation, as
do an increasing number of Indian citizens (Qaiyum, 1997).
Granting that ‘ambient standards of air and water pollution
continue to be routinely exceeded and in some places quality has
distinctly deteriorated’, a radical overhaul of India’s environmental
policies has been mooted (Mehta et al., 1997: 17). In tune with the
recent international debate, the argument is that restrictions and
government regulations are less efficient than fiscal incentives.
However, this approach has little to offer in terms of safeguarding
implementation. Fiscal instruments, of course, would depend on tax
collection effectively covering the entire economy, something not to
be taken for granted.
There will be little doubt that the senses of ecological threats and
frustration with government action are particularly strong in India.
However, it must be kept in mind that the emergence of the specific
policy arena in India is following a pattern that has been made out
internationally (Jänicke and Weidner, 1997, Jänicke et al., 1999). It is
normal for environmental politics to begin with symbolical measures
and then to become more stringent over the years (not least as the
result of an increasingly intense public debate).
Environment and Politics in India 71
4.3 Opposition to Government Deficiencies
In view of India’s urgent ecological crisis, social protests and
opposition movements have been emerging, mostly at local levels.
The Chipko activities to protect mountain forests and the mass
campaigns against the Narmada Dam project have gained
international media coverage. They are examples of grassroots
political opposition gaining momentum (Guha, 1989; Krishna, 1996;
Baviskar, 1997). Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha (1994) list
them as the most prominent examples of environment-related political
activities throughout India.
India has a long tradition of conflicts over the use of natural resources.
Disputes with a clear environmental aspect have occurred at
least since the British rule in 19th century (Gadgil and Guha, 1992;
Arnold and Guha, 1995). However, arguments over the right to
consume forest materials or of access to water were then seen to be
rather of a social than of an environmental nature (Gadgil and Guha,
1994). Ecological issues were interpreted as matters of resource
distribution not concerning the long-term ability of society as a whole
to survive.
Gadgil and Guha (1992) stress that up to today many
environment-related conflicts in India have a sharper social edge than
in the industrialized countries. The livelihood and survival of those
poor who are living at subsistence level are normally harmed
whenever land use, water access or urban space are in dispute (Viegas
and Menon, 1989).
Sumi Krishna (1996) points out that for poor people involved in
conflicts viewed as environmental by scholars or journalists, the
emphasis is still likely to be on the protection of their immediate
livelihood. This includes the internationally known Chipko and
Narmada movements (Guha, 1989; Baviskar, 1997). In the first case,
villagers’ rights to access and use the forest were at stake. In the
second case, farmers do not want their land to be flooded. For these
movements, ecological reasoning has become a resource in the socioeconomic
struggle to protect livelihood. This helped to create
coalitions that went beyond single communities.
Krishna compares the Chipko and the Narmada movements to
similar cases in which people were mobilized along linguistic or caste
lines. The former tend to be less violent and more effective in rallying
72 Taking the State to Court
support from outside their respective regions. They also appear to be
more successful in securing the livelihood of the people involved.
Environmental arguments mobilize entire networks in civil society
and give wider scope for successfully opposing government power.
Grassroots movements emphasizing environmental aspects have
found academic support. Members of India’s urban elites take interest
in these issues. The first widely regarded non-government
documentations of environmental decay were published by the Centre
for Science and Environment (1982, 1985).
Critical social scientists and economists generally demand a new
development model. They claim that the current policies of structural
adjustment and world market integration are adding to ecological
disaster tendencies (e.g. Shiva, 1991; Arun Ghosh, 1994, Gadgil and
Guha, 1995; J.M. Rao, 1995b; P. Sheth, 1997). Empowerment of the
rural masses is meant to lead to greater environmental protection.
Particularly the rural poor, after all, depend immediately on the
biomass production of their village and surroundings.
Skeptical of reducing complexity by means of such somewhat
romanticist ideologies, Sumi Krishna (1996) warns that it is very
likely a misconception to believe that the rural poor are inherently
more protective of the environment. Nor does she consider women to
be necessarily more ecologically aware than men, as suggested by
‘eco-feminist’ writers (Mies and Shiva, 1993).
Sentimental visions of small village communities living in
harmony with nature will easily appeal to the educated, urban elite
(Krishna, 1996; Baviskar, 1997). However, for the people concerned,
the day-to-day reality may be one of grim struggle for survival. Given
the choice, many might indeed opt for the consumerist development
model both enjoyed and despised by members of the urban
environmentalist elite. Both Krishna and Baviskar basically call for
more participative democracy to resolve such dilemmas. This, in the
end, is politically the same demand as that made by those accused of
romanticism, with the difference that Krishna and Baviskar do not
expect immediate ecological relief.
As discussed in Chapter 3, public interest litigation has become an
important arena for environmentalists (Shastri, 1990; Sharma, 1993).
Before turning to the case studies that will elaborate such matters, it
will be necessary to take a closer look at the local context of Calcutta.
Environment and Politics in India 73
4.4The Situation of the Calcutta Agglomeration
The environmental situation of the Calcutta agglomeration and the
state of its environmental polity reflect what has been stated so far for
the entire nation. The Metropolitan Area faces tremendous environmental
challenges, as has been amply documented on behalf of the
state government itself (A.K. Ghosh, 1988, 1991; State Planning
Board, 1990; CEMSAP 1995).
However, the activities of the authorities responsible have, in
general, been more symbolic than effective. Opposition to inadequate
and unimplemented government planning has been organized by
various groups and associations, with many concerned citizens now
resorting to public interest litigation. However, the activists normally
are from the middle class. Their campaigns are not based on a
struggle for their immediate livelihood.
This section first assesses the major environmental problems of
the Calcutta area. It then examines programmatic government
documents that, overall, have not been implemented. Finally, the
environmentalist action groups are discussed.
Before turning to these environmental issues, it is useful to briefly
discuss governance in West Bengal on a more general level. In the
1960s and 1970s this state was exposed to serious civil strife and was
perhaps even the most troubled state in India. ‘One measure of the
chaos that existed in Calcutta in 1970 and 1971 is that, even under
presidential rule, there could be as many as 60 political murders
committed in a day. Politics became a dangerous profession’ (Kohli,
1990: 130). Today, this no longer holds true.
In 1977, a Left Front coalition dominated by the Communist
Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) gained a solid majority in the state
assembly. It has since been repeatedly re-elected. It is generally
considered successful in having re-established civil peace and
implemented some reforms (Kohli 1987, 1990; Webster, 1992, 1995;
Lieten, 1994, 1996; Chatterjee, 1997b). It is true that some writing
supports the Left Front in West Bengal only with critical scepticism
(Echeverri-Gent, 1992; Engelsen Ruud, 1994; Sengupta and Gazdar,
1997). Increasingly, it has been stated that the Left Front is pressing
less and less for progressive social change, but rather has assumed the
role of a power broker (Olnhausen, 1990; Webster, 1995).
Nonetheless, even its harshest critic blames it only for not performing
74 Taking the State to Court
above average, rather than for particular abuses of power (Mallick,
1992, 1993).
The progressive policies implemented by the Left Front were predominantly
focused on the rural areas. They included a modest land
reform and the establishment of village self-administration (panchayat
raj). Contrary to what many well-to-do citizens of Calcutta express,
the Metropolitan Area was not totally neglected. There have been
noticeable improvements in traffic infrastructure and slum
settlements, as is elaborated in the next sections. Nonetheless, the
environmental challenges remain daunting, and some of the most
important duties of city management, for instance urban planning,
have not been carried out in a satisfactory way.
4.4.1 The Major Challenges
Calcutta has a reputation for ‘urban decay’ (B. Banerjee, 1990: 27).
According to the State Planning Board (1990: 204), it is ‘one of the
worst polluted cities in the world’. Major problem include waste
water, industrial effluents, poor sanitation and drainage, air pollution,
noise, traffic congestion, and high population density (also United
Nations, 1986; State Planning Board, 1990; Chakraborti, 1990; A.K.
Ghosh, 1991).
A few selected data and figures from the State Planning Board’s
report will suffice to illustrate the dimension of Calcutta’s
environmental drama. Measurements of suspended particulate matter
in the urban air went up to almost 420 μg per cubic metre (compared
to an allowable limit of 90 μg). Sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide
also exceeded the allowable limits. The mean noise levels in
residential areas such as Shyambazar and Gariahat rose above 80
decibels (compared to average human tolerance level of 60 to 65
decibels). Calcutta has less than half an acre of open space per 1000
inhabitants (compared to the international standard of four acres). The
CEMSAP report of 1995 confirmed these trends.
The picture for waste water disposal was equally dismal:
‘Calcutta and Howrah are not fully covered with underground system
of sewage disposal. Most of the areas are serviced by open drains.
Treatment facilities are inadequate wherever existing’ (State Planning
Board, 1990: 201). In some of the unsewered areas bucket latrines are
still regularly emptied manually, a system causing health hazards and
environmental nuisance: ‘This socially degrading system is a scar on
Environment and Politics in India 75
the three hundred year old city’, writes K.J. Nath (1991: 300) in his
contribution to a book published by the state government on the
occasion of Calcutta’s tercentenary (Dasgupta et al., 1991).
The same can be said for garbage disposal. There is no overall
collection from individual households (CEMSAP, 1995). Rather, the
sidewalks are swept and solid waste gathered in handcarts. Labourers
bring the garbage to intermediary collection points on roadsides.
From there it is removed by truck to waste disposal sites on the
fringes of the city. Estimates of the backlog of uncollected solid waste
range from 10 to 20 percent (Chakraborti, 1990) to some 30 or even
more percent (State Planning Board, 1990; CEMSAP, 1995) in the
Calcutta Corporation, the best-serviced area of the metropolitan
district.
Ragpickers and animals roam through the waste piling up at the
roadside and in the collection points. Neither the trucks nor the
handcarts are specifically designed for garbage collection (K.J. Nath,
1991). Roughly 400 tonnes of waste were estimated to be dumped
daily in canals, drains and open spaces around slum and squatter
settlements, creating serious health hazards (CEMSAP, 1995: 3.40).
Garbage was dumped in an unorganized manner, and sanitary
landfills did not exist (CEMSAP, 1995). Garbage was used by private
landowners to raise low-lying terrains prior to construction of new
buildings. Up to 1999, there was no separate disposal system for
hospital waste.
Calcutta’s urban crisis is exacerbated by several factors. First, the
metropolitan district is a poor and densely populated urban
agglomeration. Roughly one-third of the population live in slum and
squatter settlements (United Nations, 1986). In terms of per capita
income, Calcutta ranks last among India’s metropolises. Petty trading
and other forms of informal economic activities provide a living for
large sections of the population. This agglomeration is the most
densely populated urban area in India. On an average, 8000
inhabitants lived in every square kilometre in 1990, with the figure
surpassing 30,000 for the city of Calcutta proper (CMDA, 1990).
Second, Calcutta’s industrial base is probably the oldest in Asia.
In colonial times, industrialization started on the banks of the Hoogly
in the 1860s and 1870s (A.K. Mukherjee, 1992). The industrial
progress of this region was stalled for several decades beginning in
the 1960s. This was due to diverse influences such as labour unrest
and unfavourable central planning (United Nations, 1986). Tiny
76 Taking the State to Court
small-scale industries and a number of industrial dinosaurs surviving
only on subsidies today characterize the manufacturing structure. In
1988, the metropolitan area housed almost 150,000 industrial units
providing employment for some 1.2 million persons. Many units were
considered environmentally hazardous, and most do not follow norms
and scientific procedures in discharging wastes and emissions (State
Planning Board, 1990: 200).
Third, the urban agglomeration has grown for over 300 years in
an almost completely unplanned manner. Apart from the ‘British’
area in the city centre between Park Street and the government
buildings at Dalhousie Square, the city was allowed to sprawl
unchecked. ‘In the pre-independence period there was no national
policy or strategy to guide or influence urbanization’, summarizes
Tapan K. Banerjee (1991: 30). The Calcutta Improvement Trust was
established as late as 1911 (Bhattacharya, 1990; Banerjee, 1991).
Even then, it was not designed to come up with a comprehensive
urban development plan. Rather, it conceived and implemented some
isolated but expensive projects such as the construction of the
Dhakuria Park and Southern Avenue complex.
Commercial, industrial and residential areas are not separated.
The traffic infrastructure is inadequate and not systematically laid out.
Calcutta also houses a vast wholesale market in the centre of the city.
Cargo pours into the city by truck and train. Traffic congestion is
particularly bad between the two main railroad stations, Howrah and
Sealdah, where, in addition to motorized vehicles, coolies and
handcart pullers deliver all kinds of merchandise.
Immediately after independence, Calcutta had to deal with the
massive influx of refugees from what had become East Pakistan. Only
in the 1960s did concerted urban planning efforts begin. A WHO
report highlighted the risk of epidemics in this overcrowded city with
poor infrastructure. In 1970 the Calcutta Metropolitan Development
Authority (CMDA) was formed; it is the statutory planning body for
the entire metropolis (Bhattacharya, 1990 and Banerjee, 1991). It is
directly responsible to the state government.
The CMDA has operated with considerable success in some areas.
Its achievements in slum improvement are acknowledged by critics of
the state government (Forum for Calcutta, 1988). Reform of the
tenancy laws has given the residents legal security. The vast majority
of the city slums have been provided with paved footpaths, tubewells
and community latrines. The slums have been connected to the
Environment and Politics in India 77
electricity grid. They are generally better maintained than those in
other major cities, for instance Bombay or Delhi–not least because the
residents (no longer facing immediate threats of eviction) invest in
their housing.
The government has also tackled some infrastructural problems.
Calcutta, once famous for power failures for hours on end, had a
fairly reliable electricity supply in the 1990s. Tanks to major
construction projects such as the Eastern Metropolitan Bypass, the
Second Hoogly Bridge and the underground Metro Rail, traffic runs
considerably faster. The CMDA deserves its fair share of credit for
this.
However, this government body has not succeeded in drafting,
publishing and enforcing adequate development plans for the area
under its jurisdiction. The CMDA’s own categoric assessment
(CMDA, 1990:9.1) reads: ‘The chaotic sprawl that had plagued this
metropolis during the last four decades will have to be checked with
determination’.
4.4.2 Administrative Slack
Ashis K. Ghosh (1991: 61) highlights the lack of systematic planning
as follows: ‘This trend continues more than 20 years after the Basic
Development Plan (1966-1986) for metropolitan Calcutta came out’.
According to this author (1991: 64), the consequences are serious:
‘The absence of any zoning system and continuous violation of
existing norms are the major reason for the present dismal
environmental situation’.
The CEMSAP (1995) report summarizes the following
deficiencies: Subsequent planning documents were not consistent.
The growth pattern of the agglomeration did not follow the proposed
outlines. Decentralization of the urban core was as rarely addressed as
environmental issues. Finally, many reports were only internal papers
and not legally binding. The report says: ‘To date, only development
control plans for Howrah and Calcutta have been prepared, and
unplanned growth in fringe areas continues’ (CEMSAP, 1995: 5.20).
Given Calcutta’s socio-economic state as a subsistence city and
its history or urban crisis, there can be little doubt that improving the
environment will be a daunting task by any international standard (B.
Banerjee, 1990). It is, in the words of a British consultant, ‘constant
fire-fighting’ (Green, interview).
78 Taking the State to Court
In this context, it appears encouraging that the CMDA has
conceptually recognized the relevance of environmental matters. It is
worth citing at length from its 1990 ‘Plan for Metropolitan
Development 1990-2015’ (p. 6.3):
Development projects should be environmentally sound. Otherwise, it will not
be possible to sustain the development. The metropolitan development plan,
therefore, should have provision for
• conservation of nature, the wetland and wildlife to maintain ecological
balance,
• ecologically balanced waste water disposal system recycling the waste
resources as manure, fish protein and irrigation water, and thereby relieving
natural water courses from the nuisance of eutrophication,
• conservation of greeneries, parks and public open spaces and water fronts
along the river, canals and lakes,
• regulatory measures for reducing air, water and noise pollution,
• extensive tree plantation and social forestation, prohibition of indiscriminate
abstraction of ground water, development of sanitation low cost and
appropriate facilities for all, and
• safe and hygienic disposal of solid wastes in form of sanitary land fill and
garbage farming as well as incineration, energy recovery and compositing.
In addition to this last the CMDA (1990: 6.3) states:
A major concern of metropolitan development should be to ensure
environmental restoration and conservation. This will involve systematic study
of environmental impact assessment with environmental mapping.
This text basically expresses what would be the dream of most
environment activists in the metropolitan area today. We will return
to almost every single item in our analysis of two major matters
litigated in court. Both passages quoted here were copied and, nearly
word for word, included in an environmental chapter in a 1992
CMDA document concerning the development of Howrah. We will
return to the second document in the case study of the Howrah Matter
in Chapter 6. Yet another passage (CMDA, 1990: 6.10) has lasting
appeal for Calcutta’s environmentalist NGOs:
For effective decentralization of planning and development, public participation
is essentially required. The most essential basic objective of any action for
metropolitan development is to maximize community benefit. The purpose of
implementing development control measures is also to protect community
Environment and Politics in India 79
interests against individual gains. The Development Plan, therefore, should have
the approval of the people.
The paper explicitly recommends the involvement of slum committees,
important NGOs, professional bodies, chambers of commerce
and cooperatives in urban planning. This has not happened. Rather,
the report, like most government documents, is not publicly available.
As has been stated for India in general, the authorities’ track
record for the implementation of such well-conceived intentions is
rather depressing. While the Left Front government of West Bengal
reformed legislation for urban planning soon after it gained power in
the late 1970s, documents sponsored by the very same government
constantly reiterate the need for determined execution.
In its chapter on environment, the State Planning Board’s
Perspective Plan draft recommended the implementation of existing
laws ‘with all possible seriousness’ (p. 209) and the ‘rigid
enforcement of the Town and Country Planning Act (1979) along
with other (Central) Acts’ (p. 210). And the CMDA (1990), in its
basic chapter on environment, points out that urban planning should
be exercised ‘under the Town and Country Planning Act’.
Smoke nuisance legislation was introduced in Calcutta as early as
1863 (Amit Mitra, 1992: Anderson, 1995), but it still suffers from
obvious governmental and administrative neglect.2 In an essay for the
feature page of The Statesman (5.1.1998), Chinmoy Mazumdar
complained that politicians and bureaucrats had turned the CMDA
into an ‘ideal environment for open corruption’ with the result that the
Master Plan for the Metropolitan Area was ‘still not charted even
though the CMDA was statutorily established 27 years ago to do the
same’.
Such complaints are typical of South Asian mega-cities.
According to the World Bank (1999), the development authorities of
Delhi and Bangalore particularly have reputations of inefficiency and
corruption among the citizens dealing with them. Pretty much the
2 Apparently, the colonial administration in the 19th century faced tremendous difficulties
implementing anti-smoke policies. They remained ineffective for years. Eventually,
regulations put the burden of reducing smoke entirely on the workers operating the
smoke-stacks rather than on the industry owners. Only after this compromise between
administrators and capitalists was reached, on the back of labour, did the legislation have
some impact (Anderson, 1995).
80 Taking the State to Court
same complaints have been made in the case of Pakistan’s business
hub Karachi and its development authority (Zaidi, 1997).
It must be emphasized that skepticism concerning the track record
of urban planning is not confined to non-government agents. Ashis K.
Ghosh (1991: 82) concludes in his essay dealing with Calcutta’s
environment and written on behalf of West Bengal government for
book to celebrate Calcutta’s tercentenary:
The problems have long been identified. Many solutions have been evolved,
proposed and accepted, but implementation has not been forthcoming or started
and been abandoned halfway through. The quality of life in the city of Calcutta
can even now be improved with determination and effort, otherwise, the
problems would only accumulate and get worse and neglect would become more
pervasive.
Environmental Activists
Reflecting the national trend, there has also been a growth in citizens’
groups that campaign for environmental improvement. The current
network of NGOs has two distinct roots: neighbourhood and
community initiatives concerned with their immediate surroundings,
on the one hand, and nature lovers and conservationists, on the other.
While the first might be considered to be basically pursuing
environmentally relevant strategies, the latter group clearly has an
environmentalist outlook with an interest in the maintenance of the
ecological balance. For practical political purposes in Calcutta,
however, this distinction is not relevant. Both groups have found
support from engineers and scientists.3
Some NGOs date back to the early 1950s. The Tollygunge
Development Council was formed as a reaction to the particular
problems arising from the massive influx of refugees. It initially
campaigned for better infrastructure, such as the Tollygunge railway
bridge and railway station. The Howrah Ganatantrik Nagarik Samiti,
also concerned with the immediate neighbourhood, was formed in
1978, when a strike of municipal workers had put sanitation facilities
out or order for weeks on end. Such local groups increasingly pick up
environmental issues.
Other environmental NGOs in Calcutta are generally concerned
with nature conservation. In 1971, the World Wide Fund for Nature
The data presented here mostly rely on ethnographic field work during my research in
Calcutta, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, section 7.1.
Environment and Politics in India 81
started its branch office for East India in Calcutta. Besides funding
projects, it has spawned nature clubs in many of the city’s schools.
Former regional directors of this international organization now play
crucial roles in other organizations such as People United for Better
Living in Calcutta (PUBLIC) and Forum for Action and Coordination
on Environment (FACE). These again overlap with Prakriti Samsad,
as association of some sixty amateur birdwatchers and botanists.
A 1996 membership list of Calcutta 36, a loose umbrella
organization, indicates some fifty groups in the city and the
metropolitan area. Some relevant NGOs, particularly from outside
Calcutta’s city limits, are not members. Neither the Howrah
Ganatantrik Nagarik Samiti nor the South Howrah Development
Association have joined Calcutta 36.
These NGOs have a wide range of activities, including various
methods of awareness-raising such as seminars and demonstrations,
publication of leaflets, or academic expertise on matters such as
garbage, traffic, or water disposal. Prakriti Samsad specializes in
nature excursions and wildlife observation. Other organizations tidy
up garbage before holidays in order to set an example and embarrass
the municipal corporation.
The activities of some NGOs are confined to particular
neighbourhoods, others aspire to cover all of the metropolis. Some
cooperate closely with government authorities, for instance by taking
responsibility for maintaining certain public parks. While there is
strong criticism of State failures, this does not, in most cases, add up
to clear-cut partisan opposition to the ruling Left Front coalition in
power at both the state and the city levels in Calcutta and Howrah.
Many involved persons define themselves as ‘leftists’ and claim to
normally vote for the CPM and its allies. Most consider the Congress
Party even less efficient and committed.
Only a few of these NGOs interact and cooperate closely. Others
eye one another with a sense of suspicion and competition. There is a
tendency, as in social movements elsewhere, of personal animosities
as well as friendly feelings affecting the quality of coordination.
Overall, the interaction is difficult. As will be elaborated in Chapter 7,
the NGOs could very likely achieve more if they mustered enough
mutual trust to cooperate more closely. So far, there is hardly any
division of labour or active mutual support.
Typically, these groups consist almost exclusively of Bengalis
with an educated, upper caste background. English-speaking abilities
82 Taking the State to Court
are an important status symbol. Travelling abroad is not uncommon
for these people. Several of them have worked or studied in the
United States, the United Kingdom or other advanced industrial
countries.
Caste is generally declared to be irrelevant in Calcutta. However,
it cannot be a coincidence that most of the people named in Calcutta
36’s membership list as representative of over fifty associated
organizations are upper caste Brahmins, Kayasthas or Baidyas.
Muslims, who make up a large share of Calcutta’s population, are not
represented in these organizations, and nor are other communities that
make up the bulk of Calcutta’s poor population. It is worth pointing
out that members of the upper castes also make up the vast majority
of government, administration and party leadership. There are only
isolated Muslims or tribals in their ranks. The same goes for the
judiciary.
Apparently, environment is not an urgent issue for those
struggling for their day-to-day subsistence, even though pavement
and slum dwellers are among the most severely exposed to
environmental hazards. Again, as elsewhere in the world, Calcutta’s
environmental NGOs find it easier to mobilize people of their own
social strata than to reach out to others.
As education levels coincide with caste status, it is impossible for
the foreign researcher to make out which distinction is more
important. In Calcutta, reservations of social interaction such as not
sharing meals with people of other castes are seldom seen. This does
suggest that here the symbolic capital of good education and fluency
in English matter more.
Contacts with the urban poor are possible. FACE, for instance, is
involved in a sanitation improvement programme in a slum
neighbourhood along the Tolly Nullah Canal. However, such contacts
are difficult to establish and to maintain. Well-to-do NGOs do not
easily gain poor people’s trust. Purnima Dutta of FACE told me: ‘We
have to convince them that we want something for them’ (emphasis
added). However, as will be elaborated in Chapter 7, trust is also
fragile with other groups of one’s own social background.