27-08-2014, 11:35 AM
Exploring The Design Space Of Social Network Based Sybil Defenses
Exploring The Design.pptx (Size: 479.45 KB / Downloads: 8)
Abstract
Sybil detection schemes are application-independent and rely only on the graph structure to identify Sybil identities, while Sybil tolerance schemes rely on application-specific information and leverage the graph structure.
In this paper, we take a closer look at the design goals, models, assumptions, guarantees, and limitations of both categories of social network-based Sybil defense systems.
Introduction
Sybil detection and Sybil tolerance. These two categories of systems both leverage global properties of the underlying social graph, but they rely on different assumption sand provide different guarantees.
Sybil detection schemes are application-independent and rely only on the graph structure to identify Sybil identities.
Sybil tolerance schemes rely on application-specific information and leverage the graph structure and transaction history to bound the leverage an attacker can gain from using multiple identities.
Existing System
In existing system Sybil user use others IP address for communication. Attacker use address of some other system by using same source router for reaching destination.
It create major problem in the network for finding attacker. But in the existing system IP create confused while detecting attacker.
Attacker uses address of some other system which uses different IP.
Proposed System
We present a secure system to defend against Sybil attacks.
Sybil defense schemes have been designed for identity-based social systems. Each user is intended to have a single identity.
users establish friendship links to the identities of other users they recognize in the system, thereby building a social network. Sybil defenses use this social network as a basis for identifying users with multiple identities. We call a user with multiple identities a Sybil user and each identity he/she uses a Sybil identity.