03-12-2012, 11:36 AM
Mitigating selective forwarding attacks with a channel-aware Approach in WMNS
Abstract:
Denial of service (DoS) attack in wireless mesh networks (WMNs) known as selective forwarding attack (a.k.a gray hole attacks). With such an attack, a misbehaving mesh router just forwards a subset of the packets it receives but drops the others. we consider a more practical and challenging scenario that packet dropping may be due to an attack, or normal loss events such as medium access collision or bad channel quality. Specifically, we develop a channel aware detection (CAD) algorithm that can effectively identify the selective forwarding misbehavior from the normal channel losses. The CAD algorithm is based on two strategies, channel estimation and traffic monitoring. If the monitored loss rate at certain hops exceeds the estimated normal loss rate, those nodes involved will be identified as attackers. Moreover, we carry out analytical studies to determine the optimal detection thresholds that minimize the summation of false alarm and missed detection probabilities.
Existing System:
Only attack is detection Packet Loss is not found
The WMN is a multi-hop network, which relies on mesh routers to forward the packets to the destination. It is clear that successful collaboration among routers is the foundation for a strong and reliable network.
Cryptography solutions can be used to protect the mesh routers from most of the routing protocol attacks—selective forwarding, blackhole, sinkhole, and wormhole attacks [2], [3], [5]-[7]. Nevertheless, if the routers are compromised, the attacker will gain access to the public/private keys of the compromised routers and then break through the cryptographic system.
Therefore, to achieve com-plete security in a network, it is preferred to use cryptographic solutions as a first line of defense and non-cryptographic solutions as a second line of defense.
Proposed System:
Selective forwarding attack / gray hole attack Channel aware detection (CAD) algorithm
False Alarm.
In this paper, we investigate a special case of denial of service (DoS) attack, known as selective forwarding attack or gray hole attack. With such an attack, the misbehaving router accepts the packet for transmission but refuses to forward certain packets by simply dropping them. If an attacker drops all the packets, the attack is then called black hole which has been well studied [2]-[5]. To launch a selective forwarding attack, an attacker may compromise or hijack the mesh router that belongs to the network, known as internal attacks; or attack the network from outside, known as external attacks [8], [9], [10]. To prevent external attacks, routers may employ an authentication mechanism, e.g., TESLA [7], to avoid the attacks from unauthorized routers. However, internal attacks may pose severe threats and are difficult to defend by crypto-graphic measures alone. We thus focus on a non-cryptographic approach to counteract the dropping misbehavior launched by internal attackers.