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In response to the earthquake, the nuclear reactors at the Fukushima site were all safely shut down, but subsequent
power outages caused by the tsunami resulted in a failure of the cooling systems, eventually leading to a release of
radioactive material across four units.1 While the full extent of radiation leakage is yet to be determined, at the
time of writing, lethal levels of radiation had been detected at the site, raising concerns about the scale of the
impacts, particularly for workers.2 The accident had been rated as a level 7 “major accident” on the International
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES), having been revised from a level 5 event to the most serious level
on INES, used to describe an event involving a “major release of radioactive material with widespread health and
environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.”3 Approximately
170,000 people were evacuated from a 20-km radius around Fukushima following the events, and further
evacuations are now being undertaken within a 30-km zone.
These events come at a time of projected global resurgence in nuclear energy facility development, with an
estimated 360 gigawatts of additional nuclear generating capacity projected to be developed worldwide by 2035,
on top of the 390 gigawatts already in use.4 This renewed interest in nuclear is, in part, due to its potential as a low
carbon energy source, but also because of concerns about energy security as energy demand and competition for
hydrocarbon fuels increase worldwide. In the context of this so-called “nuclear renaissance” the technology has,
however, remained contentious, provoking vociferous public debate and, in the U.K. case at least, even legal
battles.5 The full extent of what the events in Japan might mean for nuclear power in this contemporary context of
renewed political and market interest are yet to be seen. While the debate is likely, in the first instance at least, to
be dominated by technical and safety considerations, it seems timely to reexamine existing social science research
on nuclear energy and think through some of the key sociopolitical dimensions in light of this accident.
It will not, of course, be possible to address all of the social science questions pertinent to this issue. We aim to
cover key aspects, structuring our discussion around four sections themed according to major areas of research that
have addressed nuclear energy as a substantive issue. The themes are divided as follows: policy, political
acceptability, and economics; public opinion and attitudes; safety, justice, and ethics; and framing and the media.
Through these interlinked sections we aim to provide an overview of some of the central issues and findings in
social science research on nuclear energy and (re)contextualize key ideas with reference to the still unfolding
disaster in Japan.
Efforts to decarbonize electricity and energy security concerns reopened a policy window to develop new nuclear
power stations in countries around the world. Even for countries, such as Germany, with no plans to pursue new
nuclear power, life extensions to existing plants were seen as an essential “bridging technology” for transitioning
to low-carbon energy systems.6 While the full implications of the events at Fukushima are still rippling through
global energy policy discourses, even at this relatively early stage two pathways are emerging: (1) amplification of
risk and withdrawal of policy support, and (2) safety review, then attenuation of risk, followed by continued
support.7
Prominent examples of the first are taking place in Japan, Germany, and Italy. It is perhaps unsurprising that Japan
has subsequently withdrawn support due to a reconceptualization of the scale of the risks involved, with former
Prime Minister Naoto Kan specifically giving the example of the evacuation zone as an impetus.8 Potentially more
startling is the reaction of the German government, which, due to the “residual risks” of nuclear power, has
rescinded support for operating-life extensions and instead aims to completely phase out nuclear power plants by
2022.9 In contrast, the United Kingdom and United States have situated the events at Fukushima as part of
“learning from experience.” This has allowed for continued adherence to the “principle of continuous
improvement,” meaning further new nuclear power occurring concomitantly with the development of more safety
measures, procedures, and knowledge.10 In this, the United Kingdom has taken a lead, solidifying its support for
eight new nuclear plants through the recent parliamentary approval of its Energy National Policy Statements.11
This suggests that Fukushima has ratcheted up current policy trends and logics in some countries, rather than
stimulating a wholesale political reversal.
In terms of economics, the events in Japan serve to refocus attention on questions concerning the evolving
relationship between private financing of nuclear energy, sociopolitical acceptability, and nuclear accidents. In the
United Kingdom, development of new nuclear generating facilities is agreed on the basis that development is
privately financed without government subsidy,12 while the U.S. administration has taken the route of offering
conditional loan guarantees.13 The assertions governments around the world have made regarding the role of
public investment in nuclear are, however, complicated by the clear implications of the accident for government
spending in Japan. The expenditure for compensation alone is estimated to be US$124 billion (£75 billion), the
costs of which will be covered in the first instance by special government-issued bonds that the private owners of
the Fukushima power station (Tokyo Electric Power Company, or Tepco) will be expected to repay over an as yet
unspecified number of years.14 Negotiations over this repayment policy occur at the same time as Tepco's share
price plummets, resulting in concerns that the costs will be passed on to customers, leading to a double burden for
the wider public (i.e., in paying through both taxes and bills). In this context, notions of a completely privately
financed nuclear sector are problematic, as in the event of an accident of any magnitude the role of government
subsidies and loans/financial guarantees becomes significantly complicated.
The global trends in private financing and nuclear energy have been the subject of scrutiny both prior to and after
the accident at Fukushima. Even before Fukushima, investor decisions had been affected by “reputational” risks
associated with nuclear energy—for example, with the withdrawal of Deutsche Bank and HypoVeriensbank from
the financing of the Belene nuclear power station (Bulgaria) following protests by an internationally networked
civic group.15 After the accident, such reputational risks are heightened further and combined with closely linked
financial risks to raise questions about nuclear investment. This has led to speculation regarding whether these
events might lead to greater investment in renewable forms of energy or surges of investment in hydrocarbons. In
their “Lower-Nuclear” Scenario, the International Energy Agency (IEA) envisions that in the event of lower than
anticipated nuclear development, increased investment in hydrocarbons would lead to a 30% higher growth in
emissions than in their “New Policies” scenarios.16 Such scenarios can, however, be critiqued for being overly
optimistic in their projections of global increases in nuclear generating capacity as well as lifetime extensions, thus
overestimating the contribution to global emissions reductions that nuclear would make.17 The potential for
reduced investment in nuclear energy has resulted in further concerns about the possibilities for increased
competition over hydrocarbons and the accompanying issues this may cause for energy security, particularly in
those countries where indigenous resources are limited and where policies to phase out nuclear power have been
adopted. For the time being, it remains unclear how far investment in nuclear energy will be affected by the
Fukushima accident and, indeed, what the implications of this will be for the global energy market, carbon
emissions, or energy security. The extent to which nuclear energy development would have ever reached the levels
some were projecting had Fukushima not happened will of course always remain open to question.
Public Opinion and Attitudes
Nuclear power has, beyond its beginnings where “glamorous reactors” were anticipated with “a great sense of
excitement,” had a tumultuous relationship with the public.18 It has been characterized as a “uniquely dreaded”
technology due to its long-standing association with atomic weaponry, invisible and long-lasting effects of
radiation, and concerns about waste disposal.19 In the 1980s after the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island (1979)
and the disaster at Chernobyl (1986), public opposition to nuclear power was at an all-time high in many countries.
Indeed, data from the United States even before Chernobyl suggested that public opposition to nuclear new build
rose from around 20% in the 1970s to more than 60% in the early 1980s.20 Other research has identified public
distrust of regulators, government, and the nuclear industry to manage risks responsibly and provide truthful
information to the public as a key reason for erosion of support.21
Over the past 10 years opinion polling has indicated a reduction in opposition. For example, a global poll by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Nuclear Energy Agency showed in
2010 that support for nuclear energy had increased in countries such as the United States, Japan, Sweden, Finland,
and the United Kingdom.22 Looking specifically at the United Kingdom, polling of the British public conducted in
early 2010 found a very balanced picture, with 46% of those questioned favoring replacement or expansion of the
existing nuclear capacity in Britain as compared to 47% who wanted it closed or phased out at the end of the
existing program.23 However, a closer look at the national polling data shows a more complex picture, with a large
proportion of recent national support remaining fragile—a conditional or “reluctant acceptance” at best.24
From such research we can posit that during the short to medium term following Fukushima, many “reluctant
acceptors” may withdraw their support for nuclear power and in particular for nuclear new build. Thus opposition
during this time would correspondingly increase. Early polling research suggests this is exactly the case, with
many countries seeing a rise in opposition that outweighs support even by the thinnest margins; the United States
is a notable exception where support for nuclear power is marginally higher than opposition (see Figure 1).25 In the
case of Japan, more than half of those who indicated they now oppose nuclear energy to produce electricity do so
due to the events in Japan; significant proportions of the public in other countries also state this is the case (see
Figure 1). On the basis of such findings, we might expect that those communities who are proposed as hosts for a
new reactor may now oppose such developments.
For communities with no experience with a nuclear facility, it is likely that within the short to medium term,
potential public contestation surrounding nuclear power may indeed prove to be a stumbling block.26 However,
this is not necessarily true of all proposed reactor sites. For example, in the United Kingdom proposed sites are
either on or adjacent to an existing nuclear power station. Previous research tells us that the response of people in
such communities does not always mirror that obtained from national samples. While reluctant acceptance may be
a feature of discourse in such communities and Fukushima may prompt the “extraordinariness” of living close to a
nuclear facility to cause momentary reframings of nuclear power as a risk and threat issue, there are some
important qualitative nuances to public perceptions that may lead to differing medium- to long-trends following
Fukushima.27 Examples include the importance of social familiarity, which through social networks connected to
the power station (i.e., either being or knowing a power station worker) or through imaginary positioning (being
able to imagine how workers think, feel, and follow working practices) demystifies the power station as a distant
institutional organization.28 As such, trust in power station workers is engendered. Although hidden anxieties may
come to the surface in light of Fukushima, these could also be moderated by the distancing of the events as
irrelevant to localized contexts and working practices, serving to reify the perceived safety of local plants (and
trust in plant operators) rather than undermining it.29