31-05-2012, 01:47 PM
VIDEO FINGERPRINTING AND ENCRYPTION PRINCIPLES
[attachment=23689]
ABSTRACT:
This paper provides a tutorial and survey of digital fingerprinting and video scrambling algorithms based on partial encryption. We also propose a novel architecture for joint fingerprinting and decryption that holds promise for a better compromise between practicality and security for emerging digital rights management applications. We consider situations in which on the order of hundreds or even thousands of users may wish near-simultaneous access to the same video content. Thus, for superior scalability the network service provider must transmit the content by making use of a multicast distribution model. We focus on the problems of video fingerprinting and encryption.
INTRODUCTION:
Multimedia security algorithms that enable digital rights management (DRM) in resource constrained communication applications. Our focus is on the video-on-demand (VoD) business model, in which subscribers to a content-providing service request and receive video information at scheduled intervals. In contrast, video encryption has the goal of obscuring the perceptual quality of the host signal such that access to the content is denied. In comparison to traditional cryptographic algorithms, those for video may often be “lightweight” in order to accommodate computational complexity restrictions; the term “video scrambling” is often used to refer to such processes. The main objective of fingerprinting and encryption in a DRM context is to protect video content from a set of attacks applied by one or more attackers
Overall, the objectives of this paper are twofold:
1) To present a state-of-the-art review and tutorial of the emerging areas of video fingerprinting and encryption highlighting design challenges for multicast environments.
2) To propose the approach of joint fingerprinting and decryption (JFD) to establish a better compromise between practicality and security for DRM applications
SECURITY ARCHITECTURES:
We consider a single transmitter which may be a VoD server that we refer to as the source or server that communicates with n>1 receivers that we call users. In all situations, the source is responsible for embedding the global group watermark that may contain copyright and ownership information, and is also responsible for encrypting the media content using secret key cryptography with a group key that is common for all users. The use of a single group key for encryption under certain conditions can enable multicast communications, but requires more sophisticated key management. At the receivers, each user must decrypt the content individually. Fingerprinting can occur either at the transmitter or receiver, and separate or integrated with the cryptographic process which is the basis for our architecture classifications.
Transmitter-Side Fingerprint Embedding:
In this approach, introduced in the fingerprint is embedded at the source. An optional copy control or ownership watermark is first embedded into the host media. Then a distinct fingerprint is marked in each copy of the media to be delivered to each of the customers. Every watermarked and fingerprinted copy for is then encrypted separately using the same group key to produce One characteristic of this method is that different copies of the media have to be simultaneously transmitted, which represents bandwidth usage of order
Receiver-Side Fingerprint Embedding:
The next architecture, initially introduced in with respect to digital TV and more recently discussed and for DRM in digital cinema, involves fingerprinting at the receiver. In this scheme, shown in Fig. 1(b), the optional copyright watermark is embedded and the subsequent media is encrypted with the group key to produce the encrypted content only one encryption (and no fingerprinting) is necessary at the server, reducing latency and complexity from the previous architecture. In addition, because only one signal needs to be transmitted to multiple users, multicast communications can be exploited. At the receiver, the encrypted signal is decrypted by each user using and is immediately fingerprinted with a mark that is distinct for each user to produce the fingerprinted media . For security, both decryption and fingerprinting must be implemented on a single chip or application-specified integrated circuit (ASIC) so that the decrypted signal is not easily accessible before fingerprinting. Furthermore, tamperproof hardware, which is difficult to achieve and still an open research problem, must be used in order to protect the purely decrypted host signal from eavesdropping.
[attachment=23689]
ABSTRACT:
This paper provides a tutorial and survey of digital fingerprinting and video scrambling algorithms based on partial encryption. We also propose a novel architecture for joint fingerprinting and decryption that holds promise for a better compromise between practicality and security for emerging digital rights management applications. We consider situations in which on the order of hundreds or even thousands of users may wish near-simultaneous access to the same video content. Thus, for superior scalability the network service provider must transmit the content by making use of a multicast distribution model. We focus on the problems of video fingerprinting and encryption.
INTRODUCTION:
Multimedia security algorithms that enable digital rights management (DRM) in resource constrained communication applications. Our focus is on the video-on-demand (VoD) business model, in which subscribers to a content-providing service request and receive video information at scheduled intervals. In contrast, video encryption has the goal of obscuring the perceptual quality of the host signal such that access to the content is denied. In comparison to traditional cryptographic algorithms, those for video may often be “lightweight” in order to accommodate computational complexity restrictions; the term “video scrambling” is often used to refer to such processes. The main objective of fingerprinting and encryption in a DRM context is to protect video content from a set of attacks applied by one or more attackers
Overall, the objectives of this paper are twofold:
1) To present a state-of-the-art review and tutorial of the emerging areas of video fingerprinting and encryption highlighting design challenges for multicast environments.
2) To propose the approach of joint fingerprinting and decryption (JFD) to establish a better compromise between practicality and security for DRM applications
SECURITY ARCHITECTURES:
We consider a single transmitter which may be a VoD server that we refer to as the source or server that communicates with n>1 receivers that we call users. In all situations, the source is responsible for embedding the global group watermark that may contain copyright and ownership information, and is also responsible for encrypting the media content using secret key cryptography with a group key that is common for all users. The use of a single group key for encryption under certain conditions can enable multicast communications, but requires more sophisticated key management. At the receivers, each user must decrypt the content individually. Fingerprinting can occur either at the transmitter or receiver, and separate or integrated with the cryptographic process which is the basis for our architecture classifications.
Transmitter-Side Fingerprint Embedding:
In this approach, introduced in the fingerprint is embedded at the source. An optional copy control or ownership watermark is first embedded into the host media. Then a distinct fingerprint is marked in each copy of the media to be delivered to each of the customers. Every watermarked and fingerprinted copy for is then encrypted separately using the same group key to produce One characteristic of this method is that different copies of the media have to be simultaneously transmitted, which represents bandwidth usage of order
Receiver-Side Fingerprint Embedding:
The next architecture, initially introduced in with respect to digital TV and more recently discussed and for DRM in digital cinema, involves fingerprinting at the receiver. In this scheme, shown in Fig. 1(b), the optional copyright watermark is embedded and the subsequent media is encrypted with the group key to produce the encrypted content only one encryption (and no fingerprinting) is necessary at the server, reducing latency and complexity from the previous architecture. In addition, because only one signal needs to be transmitted to multiple users, multicast communications can be exploited. At the receiver, the encrypted signal is decrypted by each user using and is immediately fingerprinted with a mark that is distinct for each user to produce the fingerprinted media . For security, both decryption and fingerprinting must be implemented on a single chip or application-specified integrated circuit (ASIC) so that the decrypted signal is not easily accessible before fingerprinting. Furthermore, tamperproof hardware, which is difficult to achieve and still an open research problem, must be used in order to protect the purely decrypted host signal from eavesdropping.