12-07-2012, 11:16 AM
New Developments in the Voting System and Consequently
Implemented Improvement in the Representation of Legal Principles
[attachment=27477]
Introduction
Since 2001, T-Systems has been researching the creation of a highly secure voting
system that is virtually fraud- and interference-proof from cryptological perspectives
with the assistance of the PTB (Physikalisch Technische Bundesanstalt - national
metrology institute providing scientific and technical services) and other prominent
institutes. T-Systems has been exclusively responsible for the W.I.E.N (Wählen in
elektronischen Netzwerken, Voting in electronic networks) research project supported by
the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour since the start of 2005. This project
involved the implementation of online voting at networked polling stations in nonparliamentary
elections and its examination from a legal, technical and organizational
viewpoint. During this project, past experiences in the field of electronic voting
The new voting system and voting legislation principles
Public monitoring of digital voting both in person and remotely is problematic. From
constitutional perspectives, the replacement of visual and comprehension monitoring by
electoral boards and other members of the public (as witnesses etc.) is not possible.3
The voting system developed previously in the W.I.E.N. research project conformed to
the principles of the Federal Electoral Law, which was implemented through the
information-based division of powers and the use of reliable voter identification via a
qualified digital signature.4 By adding the bulletin board in the modified voting protocol,
the strenuously disputed claims to publicness of election and its transparency can now be
demonstrated. A public notice displayed using the bulletin board gives voters an
overview of votes cast and can track voting live on the Internet if the electoral organizer
wishes. Considering that online voting is seen as an alternative to postal voting, this
actually increases the element of publicness. The principle of universality is increased in
online voting as the access options are simplified, which means that more voters,
including e.g. those impeded due to professional or health reasons, can participate in the
election.
Technical Modification of the Voting System
Previous Voting Protocol
The voting protocol devised previously in W.I.E.N. was based on the voting protocol
developed in 1993 by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta entitled “A practical secret voting
scheme for large scale elections”6. This voting system primarily entails the physical and
administrative separation of the electoral register and electronic ballot box. Specifically,
the W.I.E.N. voting system consisted of four server services which are each linked with
a database for storing persistent data. The relevant data memories, which are relational
databases in their basic structure, were:
Distributor The distributor is used as a server service for transmitting the
electronic constituency data. Using this, voters can connect to the authorized electronic
electoral register (Validator) and the assigned electronic ballot box (Psephor) via the
voting clients
Verifiability:
• Universal: Everyone can verify that all valid votes were counted
• Individual: All voters can verify that their valid vote was counted
The protocol uses blind signatures as per David Chaum. This mechanism prevents the
signatory from being able to read the message to be signed. Another anonymization
technique is the mix net as per David Chaum. Essentially, a mix net receives a number of
messages, encrypts them and forwards the new messages in random order. The network
thereby breaks the link between the incoming and outgoing messages. To ensure
confidentiality and authentication, public key systems are used, e.g. RSA from Ron
Rivest et al.
The system requires the following assumptions:
A trustworthy Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is available and is used. All public keys
are validated. A certification office issues relevant PKI certificates. This implies that all
encryptions are performed using the correct public keys. All parties participate in the
PKI. The cryptography used is strong and virtually unbreakable.
Conclusions
Through changes to the voting system developed previously in the Online Voting
Project, most legal reservations against electronic voting were rebutted. The voting
protocol became simpler and faster to implement, but most significantly now offers
better integration of the general public through the use of a bulletin board. Previously
existing technical security flaws were also eliminated. This brings us one step closer to
our objective of making electronic voting feasible at networked polling stations in the
short term and using any terminals without any technical, legal or organization problems
in the medium to long term. We are assuming that online elections in non-parliamentary
elections in Germany are now within the realms of possibility.
Implemented Improvement in the Representation of Legal Principles
[attachment=27477]
Introduction
Since 2001, T-Systems has been researching the creation of a highly secure voting
system that is virtually fraud- and interference-proof from cryptological perspectives
with the assistance of the PTB (Physikalisch Technische Bundesanstalt - national
metrology institute providing scientific and technical services) and other prominent
institutes. T-Systems has been exclusively responsible for the W.I.E.N (Wählen in
elektronischen Netzwerken, Voting in electronic networks) research project supported by
the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour since the start of 2005. This project
involved the implementation of online voting at networked polling stations in nonparliamentary
elections and its examination from a legal, technical and organizational
viewpoint. During this project, past experiences in the field of electronic voting
The new voting system and voting legislation principles
Public monitoring of digital voting both in person and remotely is problematic. From
constitutional perspectives, the replacement of visual and comprehension monitoring by
electoral boards and other members of the public (as witnesses etc.) is not possible.3
The voting system developed previously in the W.I.E.N. research project conformed to
the principles of the Federal Electoral Law, which was implemented through the
information-based division of powers and the use of reliable voter identification via a
qualified digital signature.4 By adding the bulletin board in the modified voting protocol,
the strenuously disputed claims to publicness of election and its transparency can now be
demonstrated. A public notice displayed using the bulletin board gives voters an
overview of votes cast and can track voting live on the Internet if the electoral organizer
wishes. Considering that online voting is seen as an alternative to postal voting, this
actually increases the element of publicness. The principle of universality is increased in
online voting as the access options are simplified, which means that more voters,
including e.g. those impeded due to professional or health reasons, can participate in the
election.
Technical Modification of the Voting System
Previous Voting Protocol
The voting protocol devised previously in W.I.E.N. was based on the voting protocol
developed in 1993 by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta entitled “A practical secret voting
scheme for large scale elections”6. This voting system primarily entails the physical and
administrative separation of the electoral register and electronic ballot box. Specifically,
the W.I.E.N. voting system consisted of four server services which are each linked with
a database for storing persistent data. The relevant data memories, which are relational
databases in their basic structure, were:
Distributor The distributor is used as a server service for transmitting the
electronic constituency data. Using this, voters can connect to the authorized electronic
electoral register (Validator) and the assigned electronic ballot box (Psephor) via the
voting clients
Verifiability:
• Universal: Everyone can verify that all valid votes were counted
• Individual: All voters can verify that their valid vote was counted
The protocol uses blind signatures as per David Chaum. This mechanism prevents the
signatory from being able to read the message to be signed. Another anonymization
technique is the mix net as per David Chaum. Essentially, a mix net receives a number of
messages, encrypts them and forwards the new messages in random order. The network
thereby breaks the link between the incoming and outgoing messages. To ensure
confidentiality and authentication, public key systems are used, e.g. RSA from Ron
Rivest et al.
The system requires the following assumptions:
A trustworthy Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is available and is used. All public keys
are validated. A certification office issues relevant PKI certificates. This implies that all
encryptions are performed using the correct public keys. All parties participate in the
PKI. The cryptography used is strong and virtually unbreakable.
Conclusions
Through changes to the voting system developed previously in the Online Voting
Project, most legal reservations against electronic voting were rebutted. The voting
protocol became simpler and faster to implement, but most significantly now offers
better integration of the general public through the use of a bulletin board. Previously
existing technical security flaws were also eliminated. This brings us one step closer to
our objective of making electronic voting feasible at networked polling stations in the
short term and using any terminals without any technical, legal or organization problems
in the medium to long term. We are assuming that online elections in non-parliamentary
elections in Germany are now within the realms of possibility.