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AIR SUPPORT FOR THE DIVISION DEEP BATTLE: DOCTRINAL DISCONNECT by MAJ
Robert D. Grymes, USA, 55 pages.
This monograph discusses the linkage between air support and the division deep battle from 1982-1994. In 1982, the Army introduced battlefield air interdiction (BAI) as an important asset for the corps and division deep battle. After the Army published the 1986 version of FM 100-5. operational-level commanders assumed more control over BAI. Consequently, the division rarely received fixed-wing air support for its deep battle. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) in Operation Desert Storm eliminated BAI and established only two categories of air support: close air support (CAS) and air interdiction
(AI). Following the Gulf War, service and joint doctrine have abandoned the air support system that worked in the Gulf War and have reverted to the pre-war system without BAI.
The conclusions and recommendations fall into two categories: AI and CAS. First, AI was controlled by operational commanders to attack operational targets. The operational commander exercises complete authority over AI within his battlespace. Given the success of AI during Operation Desert Storm, AI doctrine works well now. However, the Army's doctrine relies too heavily on AI for the division deep battle. Army division doctrine requires revision. Divisions cannot reasonably expect AI sorties.
Second, CAS requires significant revision. Since Operation Desert Storm ended. Army and Air Force doctrine have yet to include new employment concepts for CAS. The concept that was executed in the Gulf War represents the way of the future. CAS that extends to the limits of the division deep battle provides responsive support within the division commander's battlespace.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United States armed forces finds itself "extrapolating" to remain focused on what success in the next war requires and how the military should prepare for it. Other factors such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Soviet empire, and the reduction of the U.S. armed forces also shape the doctrinal debate. Since the Gulf War, the Army and the Air Force have revised battlefield air support doctrine. Primarily, the services differ over deep battle responsibilities beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL). This debate, in particular, threatens to overshadow air support issues that exist short of the FSCL. While Army doctrine has consistently maintained a requirement for air support within the FSCL, service and joint doctrine have incompletely addressed how to employ it.
The Army has emphasized air support's critical role in the deep battle in the last three editions of FM 100-5. Operatione.^ From 1982- 1990, Army doctrine defined two forms of tactical air operations in support of Army divisions: close air support (CAS) and air interdiction
(AI). Battlefield air interdiction (BAI) comprised a subset within the category of AI. From the Army's viewpoint, air power, with its capability to mass quickly, to employ a variety of munitions, and to achieve lethal effects, was seen as a major component of the corps and the division deep fight.
During that same period, 1982-1990, the Air Force considered air interdiction as an operational asset under the control of the joint force air component commander (JFACC).^ in Air Force eyes, battlefield air interdiction was only a small fraction of the overall air interdiction effort. The Air Force, adhering to its doctrine, seldom allocated air assets to the division deep battle. Army and corps commanders, in turn, usurped any authority that division commander might have had by closely controlling what little BAI had been allocated.
Operation Desert Storm provided a battlefield laboratory that tested service and joint doctrine. Air power in Operation Desert Storm was centralized under the control of the JFACC. Neither the joint force commander (JFC), nor the JFACC, allocated aircraft for BAI during the Gulf War, despite BAI's established place in Army, Air Force, joint, and NATO doctrine. The JFC for Desert Storm granted the JFACC considerable latitude to execute strategic attack and air interdiction. Army corps and division commanders adapted to an expedient air support system that did not include BAI. However, CAS was expanded to cover the entire area short of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) and, therefore, blanketed the space formerly designed for BAI. Army corps and division commanders found themselves grappling with how to employ CAS throughout their battlespace to influence the deep battle. Although this system departed from established doctrine, it, nevertheless, worked well.
Because the procedures for directing air power departed dramatically from the established doctrine, the operational lessons of the Gulf War are not clear. Joint and service doctrine no longer discusses battlefield air interdiction. Since ground forces can no longer depend on BAI, air power in support of the division deep battle lacks doctrinal support. Alternatively, CAS has returned to its pre- Gulf War definition. Apparently, Army and Air Force doctrine have overlooked the experience of Desert Storm and have failed to incorporate an expanded deep attack role for CAS. CAS continues to be an asset for the division close battle. The new doctrine appears to diminish the division's control of air power. Post-Gulf War doctrine clearly reduces the role of air power in the division's battle and may underestimate the importance of air power in the success of a division's fight.
This monograph is a search to determine whether the gaps in current doctrine are a serious shortcoming. The evolution of air power in each of the doctrinal revisions between 1982-1990 provides a clear path to explore each service's attempt to design techniques appropriate for the conduct of the next war. The operational expedients developed during Operation Desert Storm may serve to show how that war departed from the anticipated practice and, perhaps, reveals operational aspects not recognized previously.
However, before it is possible to examine the operational and doctrinal history, it is necessary to establish a base concept by which the doctrinal shifts can be assessed. A prerequisite for an effective division deep fight is a functioning fire support system. Joint Pub 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support (Final Draft) presents the guidelines for an effective fire support system. This joint publication specifies that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) "must establish policies and procedures that--facilitate unity of effort, ensure the efficient and effective use of intelligence, [and] enhance the timely and effective engagement of targets.Similarly, if the division is to wage a successful deep attack, the division commander must also establish a capable fire support system.
The division's fire support system impacts on the effectiveness of all deep attack means to include air support. Thus, the division deep battle requires unity of effort, intelligence support, and target engagement. First, unity of effort is maximized when aircraft respond to the division commander's decisions. Second, intelligence support is optimized when it is available for timely decision-making. Finally, target engagement is optimal when air support and the suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) are integrated with maneuver and other fire support assets, and coordinated with other.airspace users. The fire support system, which depends on this three-dimensional capability, determines the division's success or failure with deep air attacks.
In each of the three distinct time periods evaluated in this monograph, the three dimensions of the fire support system define deep battle effectiveness. Unity of effort, intelligence support, and target engagement serve as criteria to evaluate not only doctrine from 1982- 1994 but also point to potential solutions for future battlefield require-ments. It must be noted that doctrinal solutions require Army and Air Force cooperation and, hence, involve a detailed understanding of both services' operational needs.
Part II; The Evolution of. Air Support (1982-1990)
From 1982-1990, Army and Air Force doctrine integrated air support into the corps and division deep battle. The first publication,
FM 100-5 (1982), introduced the AirLand Battle and served as the
stimulus for three subsequent documents in 1984: the "31 Initiatives";
U.S. Readiness Command Pamphlet 525-8, General Operating Procedures for Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK); and Air Force Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace of the United States Air ForceThese three documents essentially adopted army concepts and included them in air force and joint doctrine. The next publication, FM 100-5 (1986), expanded the army and corps roles in deep operations and reduced the importance of the division in the 1982 version. The final publication, FM 71-100. Division Operations, described in detail the role of air support in the division deep battle, although it provided more connection with FM 100-5 (1982) than the 1986 edition. The evolution of air support from 1982 to 1990 led to inflated expectations of air support for the division deep battle in the upcoming Gulf War.
The evolution began with Operations (1982) and became known as the "AirLand Battle." In effect, this document established the deep battle requirements for all of the army's command echelons and the role air power would play against a Soviet threat. The manual specified that "the numerical superiority of Soviet follow-on echelons, not the type of operational maneuver the Soviets might employ" was the driving factor requiring the deep battle.6 To prevent the Soviet numerical superiority from coming to bear in the close battle, the 1982 doctrine focused on attacking deep. The basic AirLand Battle tenet of depth expresses the deep battle requirement:
The battle in depth should delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy's uncommitted forces and isolate his committed forces so that they may be destroyed. The deep battle is closely linked with the close-in fight. All involved weapons, units, and surveillance assets must contribute to the commander's overall objective. When
we fight an echeloned enemy, such operations may be vital to 7
success.'
The manual deemed offensive air support (CAS, BAI, and tactical air reconnaissance) critical in both offensive and defensive operations.® Close air support and BAI were defined by identifying the conditions and responsibilities for employment: proximity of friendly
forces; control and coordination in planning and execution; and intelligence and target acquisition responsibilities. CAS was defined as :
. . . air action against hostile targets near friendly forces.
CAS complements and reinforces ground fire. Each air mission must be integrated with the ground commander's fire and maneuver scheme. This means that aircraft are under either positive or
procedural control.®
In contrast, BAI was defined as:
. . . air action against hostile surface targets nominated by the ground commander and in direct support of ground operations. It is the primary means of fighting the deep battle at extended ranges. BAI isolates enemy forces by preventing their reinforcement and resupply and by restricting their freedom of maneuver. It also destroys, delays, or disrupts follow-on enemy units before they can enter the close battle. BAI missions may be planned against targets on either side of the FSCL in the ground commander's area of influence. Missions short of the FSCL require
close coordination with ground units.-'-®
Close air support and BAI specified where and how the army used air support. First, CAS struck targets in close proximity to ground forces and was under the control of the supported ground commander. BAI struck targets beyond the range of CAS on either side of the FSCL. The ground commander selected the targets for BAI but did not control the air operation. Second, the ground commander was responsible for acquiring the targets for CAS while BAI target detection and acquisition was a joint responsibility. Among army units, the corps possessed the preponderance of the intelligence collection assets and was responsible for distributing intelligence.11 Third, CAS required detailed coordination and included integration with other fire support assets, suppression of enemy air defense, and airspace clearance. Coordination for BAI short of the FSCL required the same degree of detailed coordination, but CAS was easier to coordinate than BAI, because CAS was coordinated and executed under ground commander control. Thus, the definitions of BAI and CAS specified where offensive air support occurred on the battlefield.
However, offensive air support for the division deep battle was only available through battlefield air interdiction. By definition, close air support supported division forces (committed brigades) in close proximity to the enemy targets. As a tool to shape the battlefield, battlefield air interdiction remained primarily a corps asset because the corps was organized to integrate deep attacks, to manage and track intelligence, and to control attack timing.
Concurrently with corps planning, the Air Force planned the air tasking order (ATO). The air tasking order cycle paralleled corps planning more than division planning. Corps and divisions planned using enemy closure windows based on areas of influence and areas of interest. Naturally, corps planning times exceed those of the division. The corps could align its 72-hour considerations for area of influence and its 96- hour considerations for area of interest more closely with the 72-hour air tasking order (ATO) cycle. Using a shorter cycle than a corps, the division planning cycle considered a 24-hour cycle for its area of influence and a 72-hour cycle for area of interest.12 Although not yet formally approved in air force doctrine, the Army's conception of BAI greatly affected the evolving air force and joint doctrine.
Two years later in 1984, BAI gained widespread recognition with the commissioning of an Army-Air Force Joint Force Development Group study. The "31 Initiatives," as it came to be called, was a landmark document in terms of joint service cooperation. Richard Davis, author of The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Armv-Air Force Cooperation, explained how cooperation between the Army and the Air Force increased at the operational level following the Vietnam War and fostered a cooperative
army-air force dialogue in the early 1980s:
Its aftermath [the end of the Vietnam War] of decreased funding and renewed interest in planning for potential conflict in central Europe led to more interest on the part of both services in avoiding duplication of effort and in joint operations in a large scale or high-intensity war situation. The Army's preeminent role in ground combat meant that the Air Force, in order to integrate its efforts into the overall scheme of the ground battle, would have to march to the beat of the Army’s, conceptions of how to fight
the next battle.^
The Joint Force Development Group (JFDG) formed by Chief of Staff of the Army General John Wickham and Chief of the Air Force General Charles Gabriel met in this spirit of cooperation with the charter "to develop a means of designing and fielding the best affordable airland combat force which minimizes system duplication without jeopardizing force effectiveness."
The JFDG produced Initiative #24, close air support, and Initiative #21, battlefield air interdiction. The JFDG considered air support throughout the battlefield's depth in a high intensity conventional warfare scenario. The CAS initiative simply reaffirmed the importance of air force close air support for the Army and in effect required no further action. More importantly, the BAI initiative formalized the concept of BAI in joint force doctrine and adopted verbatim the BAI definition from Ooerati ons (1982) . Beyond the
definition, the two services "agreed to develop and to test procedures
synchronizing BAI and ground maneuver . . . [which] would be flexible
for use in any potential theater of war.Six months after the approval of the "31 Initiatives," the services published General Operating Procedures for Joint Attack of Second Echelon (J-SAK) in December 1984.
The authors began the J-SAK with a definition of the second echelon that applied in any theater regardless of a Soviet-style threat. They defined the second echelon "as enemy ground military formations not directly engaged in the battle at the FLOT [forward line of troops] and positioned behind the forces in contact as a reserve force, a Soviet- style second echelon, operational maneuver group, or follow-on force."16 Attacking the second echelon in the offense or defense applied to most armies, because they also employed in depth such lucrative assets such as reserves, artillery, and combat service support units.1^
The J-SAK manual also established key responsibilities and established procedures for the BAI process. J-SAK specified responsibilities at all levels to include the Land Component Commander (LCC). The LCC approved and prioritized BAI nominations by the corps. The procedures were explicit:
These targets are normally identified and prioritized through Army echelons from Divisions [and] Corps to the LCC . . . The LCC's
target nominations are furnished to the TACC [tactical air control center] through the BCE [battlefield coordination element] for integration into the ATO. These BAI target nominations will be planned and attacked in the priority provided by the LCC, subject to the availability of air assets, and the myriad of operational factors considered by the ACC [air component commander] (e.g.,
weather, target area defenses, etc.).1®
Echoing FM 100-5 (1982), J-SAK identified corps as the level at which the BAI process was to achieve its intended purpose. The Army lacked a significant deep battle capability in 1984; corps commanders considered
BAI to be a critical asset in shaping the battlefield. J-SAK recognized this fact as well by stating that "corps second echelon targets are attacked primarily by tactical air."^
In contrast, J-SAK did not provide the division any significant tactical air capability for its deep fight. Divisions nominated targets for inclusion with the corps BAI nominations. The corps took its nominations and the division nominations and ranked the entire list before submitting it to the land component commander (LCC). The LCC then approved BAI nominations based on the army and corps deep battle objectives. The LCC decided the order in which BAI attacked the nominated targets. The nomination process generated operational level targets. However, army and corps concern were given a first priority. Division targets, always tactical in nature, would only be approved in a review process presided over by an operational level commander, the LCC. The J-SAK concept, therefore, expected divisions to fight predominately with their own deep assets and to request support from the corps if needed.20 The division could not depend on BAI for its deep battle.
The final document published in 1984, AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, was developed concurrently with the "31 Initiatives." This manual incorporated BAI as a subset of air
interdiction and distinguished between the two as follows:
Air interdiction attacks against targets which are in a position to have a near term effect on friendly land forces are referred to as battlefield air interdiction. The primary difference between battlefield air interdiction and the remainder of the air interdiction effort is the level of interest and emphasis the land commander places on the process of identifying, selecting and attacking certain targets. Therefore, battlefield air interdiction is controlled and executed by the air commander as an integral
part of a total air interdiction campaign.21
Although the Air Force supported the BAI concept, BAI remained firmly within the air commander's control. Similar to the J-SAK procedures, the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) in consultation with the BCE, directed air interdiction and BAI to support the main effort of a particular corps, a division, or other unit. From its theater level- perspective, the Air Force, using its C3I network, would centrally control and rapidly mass its assets at the decisive point. This approach failed to assure a predetermined number of BAI sorties for the corps commander, but did ensure that a designated ground effort was weighted with air power as the main effort.22 Conceptually, the Air Force interdicted lines of communication as well as approaching enemy forces. Historically, the Air Force focused on lines of communication rather than on hard-to-find, moving enemy formations. By incorporating attacks on enemy forces using BAI, the Air Force deviated from its traditional emphasis on lines of communications.22 In so doing, the Army would receive more responsive support for its deep battle.
Establishing BAI in Army, Air Force, and joint doctrine constituted only a first step in developing an asset for the division deep battle. The key to the entire process lay with the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and the apportionment decision. To describe the process briefly, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) recommended a percentage of BAI from the total sorties available for AI. The recommendation could be developed in one of two ways: (1) the JFACC
and the LCC negotiate the percentage of AI dedicated to BAI and submit the agreement for JFC approval; or, (2) the JFC would establish the proportion of the AI to be set aside for BAI. Remembering the J-SAK procedures specified earlier, the land component commander only decided