04-10-2012, 01:00 PM
E-Voting as a Tool Enhancing Good Governance of the Election Process: A Critical Evaluation
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ABSTRACT
There is a trade off inherent in e-voting, namely speed vs accuracy, transparency and reliability. This paper sheds light on the different arguments around e-voting, presenting recommendations on best practices in operation and technology as well as providing Egypt-specific suggestions for program formulation. The paper draws attention to the human factor, the electoral process and the macro political context in order to warn against a technology-centered approach. The paper suggests the need for diagnostic analyses and needs assessment of constraints, capacities and institutional requirements in order to safeguard a sustainable impact on good governance. Last but not least, it provides the reader with a variety of international links covering, best practices, references and technology related to digital voting.
Introduction
There is a trade off inherent in e-voting, namely speed vs accuracy, reliability and transparency. It is partly contingent upon the design of the technology used, its management as well as on the human factor, i.e. the intentions of those implementing it and the capacity of those using it (i.e. voters). Thus, as a tool, e-voting in and of itself cannot guarantee the enhancement of good governance.
The main question to be posed is: what for? Oft e-voting is a tool for quick recording and counting of votes. In some instances, it is a tool for accuracy. The impact of e-voting on the transparency and efficiency of the election process is dependent on a number of variables among them the usability of the technology and the capacity of election clerks, monitors and voters to handle it; there are other factors that generally apply whether to electronic or paper voting; these are: the independence of election management authorities, election information, candidate information, voting behaviour, counting and reporting of results. One important factor is the available in-country capacity for electoral research in general and the technologies therein in particular. A final factor is that of in-country resources made available for evaluation, correction and constant improvement of electoral systems, including their technology as well as the institutional resources (i.e. rules and regulations of elections and access to information; judicial oversight; civil society oversight; independent election management and auditing authorities).
Arguments against E-Voting
• It is easy to design it badly; it is difficult to design it well. Issues of language, layout, font, instructions, etc. are key.
• If the tabulation program is not password protected, it may be exposed to hackers, to election staff members or to software developing companies. This is part of the ordeal of the Diebold Inc. which provides e-voting machines in various American states.
• In the USA elections, it is reported that votes were erased and went unaccounted for, while other votes were added to the names of the presidential incumbent candidates again in an unaccounted for way.
Recommendations of a best practice symposium :
• There is a trade off between speed and accuracy; thus it might be good to combine paper and electronics;
• Never underestimate the importance of the human factor; thus it might be wise to invest in training and monitoring;
• Invest in the usability of the design and check it regularly for errors and corrections;
• Non aggregated audit trails are important to ensure transparency;
• Never bestow too much trust in technology vendors; open, competitive markets are needed;
• Make sure the needs assessment and design are NOT done by the vendor but by an impartial, such as academic or independent consultant.
Recommendations for Quality of the Technology & Process
Several things can be done to make electronic voting fair, reliable, and secure :
1. A truly independent national certification authority, in possession of the complete source code for all approved software, firmware, compilers, etc., must be established. This authority would be responsible for establishing the necessary security standards, and verifying compliance.
2. No software or firmware for which the certification authority lacks full source code may be certified. All certified software must be cryptographically signed by the authority. Checksums must be verified on election day to expose software or firmware tampering. Any discrepancy, however minor, renders a machine or a database system unusable.
3. Terminals must not be capable of accepting any sort of remote connection.
4. There must be fragile seals, difficult to counterfeit and issued by an independent authority, put in place after testing and certification, to expose hardware tampering. Any failure, however minor, renders a machine unusable. The certification authority must establish protocols for quarantining and auditing a suspect or malfunctioning machine.
5. Terminals should have an internal hard disk drive for tabulating votes, cryptographically protected and designed independent of the memory system, to serve as a backup device for recounts. The terminals must be capable of extensive access and system logging, and logs must be audited when a machine is suspect or malfunctions. A random sample of machines should also be audited thoroughly after every election.
6. Data transferred from one device or component to another device or component, or over a network connection, must be protected cryptographically.
7. There must be no vendor backdoors or default admin passwords to any component or device.
8. There must be robust access controls for the database, full access and system logging and log auditing, supervised by an authority independent of the vendors and their service contractors. No election must be certified until auditing is complete.
9. There must not be any unsupervised or unauthorized access to the machines or the database after certification. Evidence of unsupervised or unauthorized access renders a system unusable, unless it can be fully re-tested and re-certified before the election.